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Abstract
In this paper, we address the issue of how Gelfond and Lifschitz’s answer set semantics for
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used to define preferred answer sets and thus to increase the set of consequences of a program. We
define a strong and a weak notion of preferred answer sets. The first takes preferences more seriously,
while the second guarantees the existence of a preferred answer set for programs possessing at least
one answer set.
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1. Introduction
Preferences among default rules play an important role in applications of nonmonotonic
reasoning. One source of preferences that has been studied intensively is specificity
[34,54,67,68]. In case of a conflict between defaults we tend to prefer the more specific
one since this default provides more reliable information.
Specificity is an important source of preferences, but not the only one. In the legal
domain it may, for instance, be the case that a more general rule is preferred since it
represents federal law as opposed to state law [57]. In these cases preferences may be based
on some basic principles regulating how conflicts among legal rules are to be resolved.
Also in other application domains, like model based diagnosis, configuration or decision
making, preferences play a fundamental role and their relevance is well-recognized.
Prioritized versions for most of the existing nonmonotonic formalisms have been pro-
posed, e.g., prioritized circumscription [31], hierarchic autoepistemic logic [37], priori-
tized default logic [3,8,48], prioritized theory revision [6,49], or prioritized abduction [23].
Somewhat surprisingly, preferences have received less attention in logic programming.
This may be explained by the fact that for a long period, logic programming was mainly
conceived as a logical paradigm for declarative programming, and to a less extent as a
tool for knowledge representation and reasoning. However, in the recent past, it has be-
come evident that logic programming can serve as a powerful framework for knowledge
representation, cf. [4,28]. If logic programming wants to successfully stand this challenge,
it must provide the features which have been recognized as indispensable in the context
of knowledge representation. One such feature is the possibility to handle specificity and
priority of knowledge.
This motivates an investigation of the possibilities to enhance logic programs with
priorities. In a previous paper [9], one of the authors has defined a prioritized version of
well-founded semantics for extended logic programs. In the present paper, we investigate
prioritized programs under answer set semantics [30], which is regarded as the second
standard semantics for extended logic programs. Notice, however, that the approach in the
present paper is not a simple extension of the previous approach: it is based on different
philosophical grounds.
Let us first characterize somewhat more precisely what we want to achieve. We consider
programs supplied with priority information, which is given by a supplementary strict
partial ordering of the rules. This additional information is used to solve potential conflicts;
that is, we want to conclude more than in standard answer set semantics. On the other hand,
unless the program with the given preference information is unsatisfiable (in a sense to be
made precise) we want to conclude only literals that are contained in at least one answer
set. The best way to achieve these goals is to use the preferences on rules for selecting
a subset of the answer sets, which we call the preferred answer sets. The definition of
preferred answer sets is thus one of the main contributions of this paper.
To give the flavor of our approach, we consider a simple motivating example. The
following logic program represents the classical birds & penguins example:
(1) peng(tweety) ←
(2) bird(tweety) ←
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(3) ¬flies(x) ← not flies(x),peng(x)
(4) flies(x) ← not ¬flies(x),bird(x).
This program has two answers sets: A1 = {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),¬flies(tweety)}
and A2 = {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),flies(tweety)} (for precise definitions, see Sec-
tion 2).
Now let us assume that the rule numbers express priorities, such that rule (1) has the
highest priority and rule (4) the lowest. Then, the answer set A2 is no longer intuitive:
indeed, flies(tweety) is concluded by applying rule (4); on the other hand, the rule (3)
has higher priority than (4), and thus ¬flies(tweety) should be concluded. Our approach
handles this example as desired, as A1 is the preferred answer set.
As mentioned before, a number of prioritized versions of default logic [60] have been
defined. It is well known that extended logic programs can be translated to default theories
in a straightforward manner, cf. [30,48], and that the answer sets of a program are in one-
to-one correspondence with the extensions of the respective default theory. One may thus
conclude that the existing proposals for prioritized default logics, e.g., [3,8,18,48,61], are
sufficient to specify preferred answer sets. However, it turns out that all these approaches
are unsatisfactory. This will be demonstrated in Sections 3 and 9. The intuitive reason for
the failure of these approaches is that some of them implicitly recast Reiter’s default logic
to a logic of graded beliefs, while others overly enforce the application of rules with high
priority, which leads to counterintuitive behavior.
Our approach takes a different perspective, which is dominated by the following two
main ideas. The first is that the application of a rule with nonmonotonic assumptions
means to jump to a conclusion, and this conclusion is yet another assumption which has to
be used globally in the program for the issue of deciding whether a rule is applicable
or not. The second is that the rules must be applied in an order compatible with the
priority information. We take this to mean that a rule is applied unless it is defeated via
its assumptions by rules of higher priorities. This view is new and avoids the unpleasant
behavior which is present with the other approaches. Our formalization of these ideas
involves a dual of the standard Gelfond–Lifschitz reduction and a certain operator used
to check satisfaction of priorities.
At this point the reader might ask a methodological question: how can we be sure that
the approach presented here, even if it performs better than existing approaches on several
examples, will not fail on future examples? Is what we propose an ad hoc fix that will need
further fixing after a short period of time in the light of new examples?
This is certainly a concern which needs to be taken very seriously. In order to base our
approach on firmer ground, we set forth some abstract principles that, as we believe, any
formalization of prioritized logic programs should satisfy, and in a wider context related
formalisms for knowledge representation as well. We demonstrate that our approach
satisfies these principles, while other approaches fail on them. The investigation of abstract
principles for priorities in knowledge representation formalisms is to the best of our
knowledge novel and constitutes another contribution of this paper. We certainly do not
claim our principles to be complete in any reasonable sense—an exhaustive investigation
of this issue is a comprehensive task of its own, comparable to analogous studies in the field
of nonmonotonic reasoning [1,19,20,36,39,43]. Nevertheless, we believe that considering
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such abstract principles as a coherence check is an important step into the right direction,
leading to a more effective and focused development of prioritized frameworks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls the
definitions of extended logic programs and introduces basic notations. Section 3 introduces
two basic principles for preference handling in rule based nonmonotonic systems, reviews
some approaches to prioritized default logic and demonstrates that they fail to satisfy the
principles.
In Section 4, we then present our approach, by introducing the concept of preferred
answer sets. We demonstrate the approach on a number of examples, and investigate in
Section 5 its properties. As it appears, preferred answer sets are in some contexts too
strict, and a program which has an answer set may lack having a preferred one. In order to
handle this problem, we define in Section 6 also a weak notion of preferred answer sets.
Intuitively, the strong notion of answer sets takes preferences more seriously, which may
lead to a situation in which the priorities are incompatible with the answer set condition;
this is avoided in the weaker notion.
In Section 7, we address the issue of computing preferred and weakly preferred answer
sets. We describe algorithms and analyze the complexity of our approach, where we focus
on the propositional case. It appears that strong preference does not add to the complexity
of answer sets in the most important reasoning tasks, and that weak preference leads only
to a mild increase of complexity. In particular, all considered reasoning problems are in
the polynomial time closure of NP. Section 8 demonstrates how the preferred answer set
approach can be applied to problems in qualitative decision making. Section 9 discusses
related work, and Section 10 concludes the paper by considering possible extensions and
outlining further work.
In order to increase readability and not to distract from the flow of reading, proofs of
technical results have been moved to the appendix, with the exception of short proofs and
those which, as we think, should be seen together with the result.
2. Preliminaries and notation
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of logic programming;
see [42] for background. In the present paper, we focus on extended logic programs as
in [30], which have two kinds of negation.
As usual, let L be an underlying countable first-order language. Unless stated otherwise,
L is the language generated by the program or rule base under consideration.
A rule r is a formula
c← a1, . . . , an,not b1, . . . ,not bm (1)
where the ai, bj and c are classical literals, i.e., either positive atoms or atoms preceded
by the classical negation sign ¬. We denote by head(r) the head of rule r . The symbol not
denotes negation by failure (weak negation), while ¬ denotes strong negation (sometimes
called explicit negation). We will call a1, . . . , an the prerequisites of the rule and use pre(r)
to denote the set of prerequisites of r . A rule is called prerequisite-free, if n= 0.
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A rule baseR is a (possibly infinite) collection of rules; an extended logic program (logic
program or program, for short) P is a finite rule base. 2 As usual, a rule (respectively, rule
base, program) is ground, if no variable occurs in it; a rule base (respectively, program) is
prerequisite-free, if all rules in it are prerequisite-free.
For a rule base R, we denote by R∗ the ground instantiation of R over the Herbrand
universe of the language L. Moreover, we denote by Lits the set of all classical ground
literals of L.
We say a rule r of the form (1) is defeated by a literal `, if `= bi for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
and we say it is defeated by a set of literals X, if X contains a literal that defeats r .
Let us recall the definition of the answer set semantics for extended logic programs [30].
Answer sets are defined in analogy to stable models [29], but taking into account that atoms
may be preceded by classical negation.
Definition 2.1. Let R be a collection of ground rules, and let X ⊆ Lits be a set of ground
literals. The reduct of R with respect to X (for short, X-reduct of R), denoted RX , is the
collection of rules resulting from R by
• deleting each rule which is defeated by X, and
• deleting all weakly negated literals from the remaining rules.
This reduction of R is often called Gelfond–Lifschitz reduction, after its inventors [29].
Definition 2.2. Let R be a collection of ground rules without weak negation. Then, Cn(R)
denotes the smallest set S ⊆ Lits of ground literals such that:
(1) S is closed under R, i.e., for any rule
a← a1, . . . , an in R,
if a1, . . . , an ∈ S, then a ∈ S; and
(2) S is logically closed, i.e., either S is consistent or S = Lits.
Definition 2.3. Let R be a collection of ground rules. Define an operator γR(X) on the
sets X of ground literals as follows:
γR(X)= Cn
(
RX
)
.
Then, a set X of ground literals is an answer set of R iff X = γR(X).
The collection of answer sets of R is denoted by AS(R). For an arbitrary logic pro-
gram P , the collection of answers sets AS(P ) is given by AS(P )=AS(P ∗).
A ground literal L is a consequence of a programP under answer set semantics, denoted
P |=L, iff L is contained in all answer sets of P . For more on answer sets, consult [30].
We illustrate the definitions using the birds & penguins example from above.
2 Like other authors, we reserve the term logic program for a finite collection of rules. This conforms with the
view that a program should be a finite object. Other authors consider logic programs that are (restricted) recursive
sets of rules, cf. [45]. The term “program” seems inappropriate for any nonrecursive collection of clauses.
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Example 2.1. Consider the program P containing the following rules:
peng(tweety) ←
bird(tweety) ←
¬flies(x) ← not flies(x),peng(x)
flies(x) ← not ¬flies(x),bird(x).
This program has two answer sets, namely
A1 =
{
peng(tweety),bird(tweety),¬flies(tweety)}
and
A2 =
{
peng(tweety),bird(tweety),flies(tweety)}.
Indeed, the A1-reduct of P ∗ is the program:
peng(tweety) ←
bird(tweety) ←
¬flies(tweety) ← peng(tweety).
Applying Cn(·) to this program yields
Cn(P ∗A1)= {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),¬flies(tweety)}=A1.
Thus, γP ∗(A1)=A1, which means that A1 is an answer set of P . Similarly, the A2-reduct
of P ∗ is the program:
peng(tweety) ←
bird(tweety) ←
flies(tweety) ← bird(tweety).
Applying Cn(·) to this program yields {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),flies(tweety)}. Thus,
γP ∗(A2)=A2, and hence A2 is an answer set of P . Clearly no further answer set exists.
Therefore, neither P |= flies(tweety) nor P |= ¬flies(tweety) holds; both literals
flies(tweety) and ¬flies(tweety) are unknown.
3. Problems with existing DL-approaches
Different prioritized versions of Reiter’s default logic [60] have been proposed in the
literature, e.g., [3,8,18,48,61]. We will show that all of them suffer from weaknesses and
thus cannot serve—via the standard translation from extended logic programs to default
theories—as a satisfactory specification of preferred answer sets.
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3.1. Principles for priorities
Before discussing these approaches, we want to formulate two principles which as we
believe should be satisfied by any system which is based on prioritized defeasible rules.
Since we want our principles to cover different approaches like default logic, prioritized
logic programs, etc. we use in this section the generic terms belief set (for extension, answer
set, . . .) and prioritized theory (for prioritized default theory, prioritized logic program, . . .)
in our formulations.
The first principle can be viewed as a meaning postulate for the term “preference” and
states a minimal requirement for preference handling in rule based systems:
Principle I. Let B1 and B2 be two belief sets of a prioritized theory (T ,<) generated by
the (ground) rules R ∪ {d1} and R ∪ {d2}, where d1, d2 /∈R, respectively. If d1 is preferred
over d2, then B2 is not a (maximally) preferred belief set of T .
In this context, a rule r is said to be generating with respect to a belief set B , if the
prerequisites of r are in B and B does not defeat r . It is hard to see how the use of the term
“preference among rules” could be justified in cases where Principle I is violated.
The second principle is related to relevance. It tries to capture the idea that the decision
whether to believe a formula p or not should depend on the priorities of rules contributing
to the derivation of p only, not on the priorities of rules which become applicable when p
is believed:
Principle II. Let B be a preferred belief set of a prioritized theory (T ,<) and r a (ground)
rule such that at least one prerequisite of r is not in B . Then B is a preferred belief set of
(T ∪ {r},<′) whenever<′ agrees with < on priorities among rules in T .
Thus, adding a rule which is not applicable in a preferred belief set can never render
this belief set nonpreferred unless new preference information changes preferences among
some of the old rules (e.g., via transitivity). In other words, a belief set is not blamed for
not applying rules which are not applicable.
We will see that most of the existing treatments of preferences for default logic,
described in [3,8,48,61], violate one of these principles. As mentioned in the introduction,
we think that any formalization of prioritized logic programs should satisfy the above
principles. Even if the reader does not subscribe to this view, the above and similar
principles are still of interest as they may be used for classifying different patterns of
reasoning.
3.2. Control of Reiter’s quasi-inductive definition
The first group of proposals [3,8,48] uses preferences to control the quasi-inductive
definition of extensions [60]: in each step of the generation of extensions the defaults
with highest priority whose prerequisites have already been derived are applied. Now what
is wrong with this idea? The answer is: the preferred extensions do not take seriously
what they believe. It may be the case that a less preferred default is applied although the
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prerequisite of a conflicting, more preferred default is believed in a preferred extension. As
we will see, this can lead to situations where Principle I is violated.
The mentioned approaches differ in technical detail. We do not present the exact
definitions here; instead, we will illustrate the difficulties using an example for which all
three approaches obtain the same result.
Example 3.1. Assume we are given the following default theory: 3
(1) a : b/b
(2) true : ¬b/¬b
(3) true : a/a
Assume further that (1) is preferred over (2) and (2) over (3). This default theory has two
Reiter extensions, namely E1 = Th({a,b}), which is generated by rules (1) and (3), and
E2 = Th({a,¬b}), which is generated by rules (2) and (3). The single preferred extension
in the approaches mentioned above is E2. The reason is that the prerequisite of (2) is
derived before the prerequisite of (1) in the construction of the extension. The approaches
thus violate Principle I.
This unpleasant behavior of selecting E2 in the previous example was already observed
in [8]. In that paper, the author tried to defend his approach arguing that there is only weak
evidence for the literal a in our example. We revise our view, however, and do not support
this argument any longer. After all, default logic is not a logic of graded belief where
degrees of evidence should play a role. Default logic models acceptance of belief based
on defeasible arguments. Since a is an accepted belief, rule (1) should be applied and E1
should be the preferred extension in the example.
3.3. Rintanen’s approach
An entirely different approach was proposed by Rintanen in [61] for normal default
logic, which has been extended to full default logic in [62]. Rintanen uses a total order on
defaults to induce a lexicographic order on extensions.
Call a default rule r = α : β1, . . . , βn/γ applied in a set of formulas E (denoted
appl(r,E)), if
E |= α and {¬β1, . . . ,¬βn} ∩E = ∅
holds. Denote by appl(r,E,E′) that appl(r,E) is true and appl(r,E′) is false.
Then, an extension E of the default theory 1 = (W,D) is a preferred extension with
respect to a partial ordering< onD, if there exists a strict total ordering<′ compatible with
<, such that for all extensions E′ of 1 and default rules r ∈1, it holds that appl(r,E′,E)
is true only if there is some default rule r ′ ∈D such that r ′ <′ r and appl(r ′,E,E′) is true.
In other words, E is preferred if we can arrange the rules in a total ordering such that any
3 We assume that the reader knows the basic concepts of standard default logic [60]; informally, a default rule
a:b/c corresponds to the clause c← not ¬b,a.
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rule r applied in an arbitrary extension E′ is either applicable in E, or it is preceded by a
rule r ′ that is applied in E but not in E′.
Unfortunately, also this approach leads to counterintuitive results and to a violation of
our principles.
Example 3.2. Consider the following default theory, which is similar to the one in
Example 3.1:
(1) a : b/b
(2) true : ¬a/¬a
(3) true : a/a
Again (1) is preferred over (2), and (2) over (3). The default theory has two Reiter
extensions, namely E1 = Th({¬a}) and E2 = Th({a,b}). Intuitively, since the decision
whether to believe a or not depends on (2) and (3) only, and since (2) is preferred over (3),
we would expect to conclude ¬a, in other words, to prefer E1.
According to Rintanen’s approach, however,E2 is the (unique) preferred extension. The
reason is that in E2 default (1) is applied. Belief in a is thus accepted on the grounds
that this allows us to apply a default of high priority. This is far from being plausible and
amounts to wishful thinking. It is also easy to see that Principle II is violated: E1 clearly is
the single preferred extension of rules (2) and (3) in Rintanen’s approach. Adding rule (1)
which is not applicable in E1 makes E1 a nonpreferred extension.
In [62], Rintanen presents also a variant of the approach described above, which
is weaker, i.e., admits more preferred extensions. An extension is a weakly preferred
extension of 1 = (D,W) with respect to <, if for every extension E′ of 1 there exists
a strict total ordering <′ compatible with < such that for every default rule r ∈ D,
appl(r,E′,E) is true only if some r ′ ∈ D exists such that r ′ <′ r and appl(r ′,E,E′)
holds. As easily seen, every preferred extension is weakly preferred; the converse is
false, however. On the previous example, this variant behaves as the first approach, and
is thus also not satisfactory. Further approaches to prioritized default logic are defined in
[62, p. 227], where defeated default rules are used instead of applied rules in the defini-
tion of preferred extension. However, these approaches violate the principles described
above.
Since all these approaches suffer from drawbacks, they cannot serve as a basis for a
satisfactory definition of preferred answer sets. Our new proposal will be developed in the
following section.
4. Prioritized programs and preferred answer sets
In this section, we present our approach for incorporating priorities into extended logic
programs. In this approach, priorities are specified like in other approaches by an ordering
of the rules. This ordering will be used to test if an answer set is constructed by applying
the rules in a proper order. However, and this is the salient point of our approach, the proper
306 G. Brewka, T. Eiter / Artificial Intelligence 109 (1999) 297–356
order of rule application will not be enforced during a quasi-inductive construction of an
answer set, but will rather be ensured in a separate additional condition which requires
a dual reconstruction of the answer set. Our approach derives from the following two
underlying ideas:
(1) Applying rules with default negation means to jump to conclusions, and any such
conclusion has to be used globally throughout the program when the applicability
of a rule is tested.
(2) Rules must be applied in an order compatible with the priorities. It appears that
this is intuitively the case if each rule whose prerequisites are true and whose
assumptions are not defeated by the rules with higher priority, is applied.
Based on these considerations, we develop our approach.
4.1. Prioritized extended logic programs
We start with the syntactical part of our framework for specifying priorities on extended
logic programs, and define the concepts of prioritized rule bases and extended logic
programs as follows.
Definition 4.1. A prioritized rule base is a pairR= (R,<), where P is a rule base and <
is a strict partial order on R which is well-behaved with respect to R. In particular,R is a
prioritized (extended) logic program, if R is an (extended) logic program.
We call a partial order < well-behaved with respect to R iff the ground instantiation of
(R,<) is defined (see Definition 4.2 below). Recall that a strict partial order is an irreflexive
(a 6< a, for all elements a) and transitive relation. The order< is used to express preference
information: r1 < r2 stands for “r1 has higher priority than r2”. Our goal is to use this
information to define the notion of a preferred answer set.
We use here a partial order rather than a total order on the rules, which is appropriate
for different reasons. The first reason is that in some scenarios it may be unwanted or even
unnatural to specify an order between rules. For example, if we have the facts bird(tweety)
and peng(tweety), then the ordering of these facts is intuitively irrelevant, and we do not
want to care about it.
A second reason is that, as rules represent their ground instances, we can pass easily
from a program P with variables to its ground instantiation P ∗ while the intuitive meaning
of priorities on rules is preserved. For example, if we have rules
r1: p(x)← q(x)
r2: r(x)←¬s(x, y)
such that r1 < r2, then by passing to the ground instances, the naturally induced partial
order says that every instance of r1 has higher priority than any instance of r2, while no
priorities are given between the instances of r1 and of r2, respectively.
If we adopt the view that rules should be applied one at a time, then a partial ordering<
on the rules is a representative of all possible refinements of< to total orderings. However,
not all total orderings are intuitively acceptable. It is natural to assume that in any totally
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ordered rule base, some rule has highest priority. This reflects the view of proceeding
from most important to less important matters, and means that infinitely decreasing chains
r1 > r2 > r3 > · · · of rules are excluded. Formally, this amounts to the condition that the
ordering< on R is well-founded, i.e., to satisfaction of the second-order axiom
(∀X ⊆R).(X 6= ∅→ (∃x ∈X)(∀y ∈X).(x = y ∨ x < y)).
Any such ordering is called a well-ordering; notice that well-orderings are customary with
infinite rule systems, cf. [44,48].
Each total ordering of a finite set is trivially a well-ordering, while this is not true
for infinite sets. It is well known that each well-ordering < of a set M corresponds by
its order type to a unique ordinal number ord(<), and thus to a (possibly transfinite)
enumerationm0,m1, . . . ,mα, . . . of the elements inM , where α is an ordinal number such
that 06 α < ord(<); we use the notation (M,<)= {mα}< for this. For example,
ord(∅)= 0, ord({a})= 1,
ord
{
(p(a),p(f (a)),p(f (f (a)))), . . .
}= ω
and so on. Moreover, every well-ordering< induces on every nonempty subset M ′ ⊆M a
unique well-ordering<′. For a background on well-orderings, see, e.g., [66].
Definition 4.2. Let P be a logic program, < a strict partial order on P . Then, the ground
instantiation of (P,<) is the pair (P ∗,<∗), where <∗ is the relation on P ∗ satisfying
r∗1 <∗ r∗2 iff r∗1 and r∗2 are instances of rules r1 and r2 in P , respectively, such that
r1 < r2, provided that <∗ is a strict partial ordering; otherwise, the ground instantiation
is undefined.
Note that in general, the relation <∗ in (P ∗,<∗) is not a partial ordering; this happens if
the priorities< are not consistent, in the sense that ground instances of rules may lead to a
priority conflict. For example, if we have rules r1: p(x)← q(x, a) and r2: p(b)← q(y, x),
where r1 < r2, then the rule r3: p(b)← q(b, a) is a common instance of r1 and r2,
which raises the contradicting priority r3 <∗ r3. Such contradictions can be effectively
recognized from (P,<). Moreover, it is easy to avoid such conflicts, by tagging rules
with dummy literals such that common rule instances are not possible. An alternative
would be to incorporate implicit contradiction removal into the definition, by adding the
constraint r∗1 6= r∗2 . However, it seems more appropriate that syntactically inconsistent
priorities should raise an exception which is handled in an explicit way, rather than by
some implicit procedure. This is why we require the partial order to be well-behaved in
Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.3. A full prioritization of any prioritized ground rule baseR= (R,<) is any
pairR′ = (R,<′)where<′ is a well-ordering onR compatible with<, i.e., r1 < r2 implies
r1 <′ r2, for all r1, r2 ∈ R. By FP(R) we denote the collection of all full prioritizations of
R. We say that R is fully prioritized, if FP(R)= {R}, i.e., R coincides with its unique
full prioritization.
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A prioritized program (P,<) may give rise to more than one well-ordered ground rule
base (P ∗,<′) (possibly to infinitely many), where <′ refines the ordering <∗, even if
the order < on P is total. The question rises how to deal with the ambiguity of full
prioritizations (R,<′) of a ground rule base R in a definition of preferred answer set
for R. A possible solution would be that some canonical (R,<′) is chosen from FP(R),
based on some principle (e.g., lexicographic ordering), and only this particular (R,<′)
is considered in the definition of preferred answer set. On the other hand, every full
prioritization (R,<′) is compatible with the priority specification in R (in particular, with
the priority information in a prioritized logic program P whose grounding is R), and if
some answer set is acceptable under <′, it should be acceptable under < as well; we thus
will define the concept of preferred answer set under this credulous view of priorities.
The investigation of the properties of preferred answer sets in Section 5, in particular the
observation in the paragraph after Proposition 5.4, provides support for this decision.
4.2. Preferred answer sets
For a ground rule baseR= (R,<) (respectively, a prioritized programP = (P,<)), we
define its answer sets to be the answer sets of R (respectively, P ), and denote the collection
of all answer sets byAS(R) (respectively,AS(P)). Thus,AS(R)=AS(R) (respectively,
AS(P)=AS(P )), which means that the ordering< is simply disregarded.
In the rest of this section, we introduce our concept of preferred answer sets, which takes
the ordering< into account. We will first formulate the criterion which an answer set must
satisfy in order to be preferred, given a fully prioritized ground rule base R= (R, <). We
then extend it to arbitrary ground rule bases and logic programs.
Recall that in the definition of answer sets, the case of rules with weak negation is
reduced to a particularly easy special case, namely to rules without weak negation. To
check whether A is an answer set of such a rule base R of ground rules, we must reduce it
with A, and then check whether the resulting rule set has consequences A.
Similarly, there is a special case where it is particularly easy to check for an answer set A
whether a full prioritization (R,<) was taken into account adequately: ground rule bases
R without prerequisites, i.e., collections where the bodies of all rules contain only weakly
negated literals. In this case, we simply have to check whether each rule in R whose head
is not in A is defeated by the consequences of applied rules of higher priority.
To model this, we associate with each fully prioritized rule base R of prerequisite-free
ground rules an operator CR : 2Lits→ 2Lits. An answer set A satisfies the priorities, in case
it is a fixpoint of CR. In the construction of CR(A), rules are applied in the order of their
priorities. In each step, the head of the current rule r is added to the collected literals, if
the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) r is not defeated by literals collected so far,
and (2) if head(r) ∈ A, then r must be applied in A. Note that condition (2) is necessary
to avoid situations in which a literal in A is derived by two rules r1 and r2 during the
construction of the fixpoint CR(A) = A such that r1 < r2, where r2 is applicable in A
but r1 is not. This would attribute the conclusion head(r1) a priority which is higher than
effectively sanctioned by the rules. We discuss this aspect later in Example 5.3 and the
preceding paragraph, which also shows that in general Principle I would be violated if
condition (2) is omitted. The formal definition of CR is as follows.
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Definition 4.4. LetR= (R,<) be a fully prioritized rule base of prerequisite-free ground
rules, let S be a set of literals, and let (R,<) = {rα}<. We define the sequence Sα ,
06 α < ord(<), of sets Sα ⊆ Lits as follows:
Sα =

⋃
β<α Sβ, if rα is defeated by
⋃
β<α Sβ or
head(rα) ∈ S and rα is defeated by S,⋃
β<α Sβ ∪ {head(rα)}, otherwise.
The set CR(S) is the smallest set of ground literals such that:
(i) ⋃α<ord(<) Sα ⊆CR(S), and
(ii) CR(S) is logically closed.
Note that for α = 0,⋃β<α Sβ = ∅ holds. Moreover, for each successor ordinal α+1, the
definition of Sα+1 can be simplified by replacing
⋃
β<α+1 Sβ with Sα ; the above definition
is uniform and more succinct, however. The sequence Sα monotonically increases and
converges to
⋃
α<ord(<) Sα .
CR is not meant to return consequences of R. It may well be the case that a rule rα
is applied in the production of CR(S) although the rule is later defeated by some less
preferred rule rβ , i.e., α < β . However, if some answer set A of R is a fixpoint of CR, then
we can be sure that all preferences in < were taken into account adequately, that is, a rule
whose head is not in A is defeated by a more preferred rule applied in A.
To see this it is helpful to note that an answer set A divides the rules R into three groups,
namely generating rules, which are applied and contribute to the construction of A, dead
rules, which are not applicable in A but whose consequences would not add anything new
if they were applied since they appear in A anyway, and zombie rules, which are those
not applicable in A and whose consequences do not belong to A. Only zombie rules have
the potential to render answer sets nonpreferred. This is the case if at least one zombie is
not “killed” by a generating rule of higher priority. By examining rules with decreasing
priority, collecting heads of generating rules and neglecting dead rules during this process
the construction of CR guarantees that indeed all zombies are defeated by rules with higher
preference whenever A is a fixpoint of CR.
We therefore define preferred answer sets as follows:
Definition 4.5. LetR= (R,<) be a fully prioritized rule base of prerequisite-free ground
rules, and let A be an answer set of R. Then A is the preferred answer set ofR, if and only
if CR(A)=A.
To illustrate this definition, let us consider a simple example.
Example 4.1. LetR= (R,<) where R consists of the following two rules:
(1) a← not b
(2) b← not a
and the ordering < says (1) < (2). The above program has the two answer sets A1 = {a}
and A2 = {b}. The set A1 is a preferred answer set. Indeed, the computation of CR(A1)
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yields S0 = {a} (rule (1) is applied and a is included) and S1 = S0 = {a} (as rule (2) is
defeated by {a}); note that ord(<)= 2. Hence, CR(A1)= S1 = {a} =A1.
On the other hand, A2 is not a preferred answer set, since CR(A2)= {a}. Thus, R has
the unique preferred answer set A1.
Let us check that the existence of a single preferred answer set as in the previous example
is not incidental, and that the use of the term “the” preferred answer set is justified in
Definition 4.5.
Lemma 4.1. Let R = (R,<) be a fully prioritized rule base of prerequisite-free ground
rules. Then R has at most one preferred answer set.
Proof. Let A1 and A2 be two answer sets of R, A1 6=A2, and assume both are fixpoints of
CR. Let r be the<-least rule such that r is applied in one of the answer sets but head(r)= l
is not contained in the other. Without loss of generality we assume l ∈A1. Since l /∈A2, r
must be defeated by the head of a rule r ′ applied in A such that r ′ < r . But since r is the
<-least rule whose head is in exactly one of A1 and A2, the head of r ′ must be in A1, so r
cannot be applied in A1, contrary to our assumption. 2
In the case of a rule base R of arbitrary ground clauses, we perform a reduction which
can be viewed as dual to the Gelfond–Lifschitz reduction: given a set of ground literals A,
we eliminate rules whose prerequisites are not in A and eliminate all prerequisites from
the remaining rules. This yields a rule base of prerequisite-free ground rulesR′ = (R′,<′),
together with an ordering<′ that is inherited fromR. We then can check whether a given
answer set is a fixpoint of CR′ .
Intuitively, our construction amounts to guessing provable prerequisites and checking
whether the assumption that exactly these prerequisites hold is possible under the
prioritized interpretation of rules. We need some formal definitions.
Definition 4.6. Let (R,<)= {rα}< be a fully prioritized ground rule base, and let X be a
set of ground literals. Let XR= (XR, X<) be the fully prioritized ground rule base such
that XR is the set of rules obtained from R by
(1) deleting every rule having a prerequisite ` such that ` /∈X, and
(2) removing from each remaining rule all prerequisites,
and X< is inherited from < by the map f : XR −→ R, i.e., r ′1 X< r ′2 iff f (r ′1) < f (r ′2),
where f (r ′) is the first rule in R with respect to < such that r ′ results from r by step (2).
It is easily seen that X< is indeed a well-ordering on XR, and that XR is thus indeed
a rule base. The definition of X< may look somewhat involved, but we have to respect
a possible clash of rule priorities due to step (2) of the reduction. Observe that we could
alternatively, similar as in [41], consider programs as multisets of rules, such that common
rule instances are possible. However, we prefer to keep the familiar framework of programs
as sets of rules; the elimination of duplicate rules is simple and intuitive, and does not lead
to technical problems.
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Example 4.2. Consider the prioritized rule base R = (R,<), where R is the ground
instantiation of the rules
(1) p(a,f (a)) ←
(2) q(f (a)) ←
(3) r(x) ← q(x),not p(x,f (a))
(4) r(y) ← p(a,y),not p(y,f (y))
and < orders the ground rules such that instances of a rule with lower number are before
instances of rules with a higher number, and instances from the same rule are ordered by
increasing depth of the ground term replacing the variable, i.e.,
p(a,f (a)) ←
q(f (a)) ←
r(a) ← q(a),not p(a,f (a))
r(f (a)) ← q(f (a)),not p(f (a), f (a))
. . .
r(a) ← p(a,a),not p(a,f (a))
r(f (a)) ← p(a,f (a)),not p(f (a), f (f (a)))
. . .
The order type of< is ω+ω= 2ω, i.e., ord(<)= 2ω. LetX = {q(f i(a)), p(a,f i(a)) |
i > 0}. Then, the dual reduct XR= (XR, X<) is the following totally ordered rule base:
p(a,f (a)) ←
q(f (a)) ←
r(a) ← not p(a,f (a))
r(f (a)) ← not p(f (a), f (a))
. . .
r(a) ← not p(a,f (a))
r(f (a)) ← not p(f (a), f (f (a)))
. . .
Note that the rule p(a)← not p(a,f (a)) results from the dual reduction of different
ground instances of (3) and (4). The map f selects for the ordering X< the reduct of
the instance of (3).
With these definitions, we are prepared for generalizing the notion of preferred answer
sets to arbitrary programs:
Definition 4.7. A set of ground literals A is a preferred answer set of a fully prioritized
ground rule base R= (R,<), if A is a preferred answer set of AR.
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A set of ground literals A is a preferred answer set of a prioritized logic program P , if
A is a preferred answer set for someR ∈FP(P∗).
The collection of all preferred answer sets ofR (respectively,P) is denoted byPAS(R)
(respectively, PAS(P)).
Notation. For convenience, we introduce an operator λR as follows: λR(X)= CXR(X).
An answer set is then obviously preferred if and only if it is a fixpoint of λR. In other
words,A is a preferred answer set just if it is a fixpoint of Gelfond and Lifschitz’s operator
γR (see Definition 2.3) and a fixpoint of λR.
To see how our approach works, let us discuss a first simple example. More examples
will be discussed in the following sections. For simplicity, unless specified otherwise we
will assume that the rules in each example are ordered by the numbering of the rules, i.e.,
rules with lower numbers are preferred over those with higher numbers.
Example 4.3. Let us consider the classical Tweety example, but impose some preferences
on the rules as in Section 1:
(1) peng(tweety) ←
(2) bird(tweety) ←
(3) ¬flies(x) ← not flies(x), peng(x)
(4) flies(x) ← not ¬flies(x), bird(x).
As mentioned above, P has two answer sets: A1 = {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),
¬flies(tweety)} and A2 = {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),flies(tweety)}.
Notice that P ∗ contains besides (1) and (2) the rules (3) and (4) instantiated with
x = tweety, and the inherited ordering <∗ on P ∗ is already a well-ordering. Thus,
P∗ = (P ∗,<∗) is fully prioritized.
Let us first check whether A1 is a preferred answer set. First, we have to determine the
dual reduct A1P∗. It contains the following rules:
(1) peng(tweety) ←
(2) bird(tweety) ←
(3) ¬flies(tweety) ← not flies(tweety)
(4) flies(tweety) ← not ¬flies(tweety).
Now, let us determine λP∗(A1)=
⋃
α A1,α , by constructing the sequenceA1,0,A1,1, . . . .
We have ord(<∗)= 4 and obtain
A1,0=
{
peng(tweety)
}
,
A1,1=
{
peng(tweety),bird(tweety)
}
,
A1,2=
{
peng(tweety),bird(tweety),¬flies(tweety)}, and
A1,3=A1,2 =
⋃
α<ord(<∗)
A1,α.
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Thus, λP∗(A1) = {peng(tweety),bird(tweety),¬flies(tweety)} = A1; consequently, the
answer set A1 is preferred.
On the other hand, let us compute λP∗(A2). The dual reducts A2P∗ and A1P∗ coincide,
and λP∗(A2)=A1. Hence, A2 is not preferred.
Thus, A1 is the unique preferred answer set of P , which is intuitive.
Notice that we have a similar behavior if we introduce other individuals in this scenario,
e.g., by adding a fact ostrich(sam) or a rule bird(father(x))← bird(x). In the latter case,
the ground version of the program is not fully prioritized, and different fully prioritized
versions have to be explored. However, for each of them, we obtain the same unique
preferred answer set, which contains A1. Thus, the way of resolving unspecified priorities
does not matter in this case.
5. Properties of preferred answer sets
In this section, we show that the preferred answer set approach has several appealing
properties, which make it particularly attractive.
First of all, we show that the problems with existing DL-approaches discussed in
Section 3 are resolved in our approach.
Example 5.1. Consider the logic programming version of the example we used in
Section 3.2 to demonstrate the violation of Principle I in the first group of DL-proposals:
(1) b ← not ¬b,a
(2) ¬b ← not b
(3) a ← not ¬a
The program has two answer sets: A1 = {a,b} and A2 = {a,¬b}. As intended,A2 is not
preferred since λP (A2)=A1. The single preferred answer set is A1.
Example 5.2. Let us turn to the problematic example for Rintanen’s approach. Also this
case is handled adequately:
(1) b ← not ¬b,a
(2) ¬a ← not a
(3) a ← not ¬a
We obtain the two answer sets A1 = {¬a} and A2 = {a,b}. The answer set A1 is
preferred: A1P contains merely rules (2) and (3), and A1 is fixpoint of λP . On the other
hand, A2 is not preferred since λP (A2)= {b,¬a}. This is exactly what we expect.
The desired behavior of our approach on the problematic examples for the other
approaches is not incidental. In fact, it satisfies the Principles I and II which we have
introduced above, as we demonstrate next.
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We start by showing that our approach captures a natural and intuitive idea about
preferences. Recall that a rule r is generating in A exactly if pre(r) ⊆ A and r is not
defeated in A.
Proposition 5.1. Let R = (R,<) be a fully prioritized ground rule base, and let A ∈
AS(R). Then, A is a preferred answer set of R, if and only if for each rule r ∈ R which
is a zombie, i.e., pre(r)⊆ A and head(r) /∈ A, there is a generating rule r ′ ∈ R such that
r ′ < r and head(r ′) defeats r .
The proposition formalizes our intuitive explanation of the definition of preferred answer
sets for prerequisite-free ground programs (cf. the discussion preceding Definition 4.5),
and extends it to the case with prerequisites.
For the proof of this proposition, the following lemma is useful. Slightly abusing
notation we use Ar to denote the prerequisite-free part of rule r whenever pre(r) ∈ A.
If pre(r) /∈A then Ar is undefined.
Lemma 5.2. Let R= (R,<) be a fully prioritized ground rule base, and let A ∈AS(R).
Then, the following are equivalent:
(i) A is a preferred answer set ofR.
(ii) For every r ∈ R, the reduct Ar is defined and fires in the construction of λR(A), if
and only if r is a generating rule of A.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. (⇒) Assume the condition of the right hand side is violated.
Let r be the<-least rule violating this condition. Clearly, Ar is contained in AR. SinceA is
a preferred answer set, it follows from Lemma 5.2 that Ar does not fire in the construction
of λR(A). Hence, Ar must be defeated by some rule in AR with higher priority. From
Lemma 5.2 again, it follows that Ar is defeated by the reduct Ar ′ of some rule r ′ ∈R such
that r ′ < r and r ′ is a generating rule of A. It follows that r is defeated by r ′, which raises
a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose that the right hand side holds, and assume further that A is an answer
set which is not preferred. We derive a contradiction. Since A is not an answer set, by
Lemma 5.2 there must exist a <-least rule r ∈ R such that Ar is applied in the construction
of λR(A) iff r is not applied in A. There are two cases:
Case 1: r is not applied in A. Then, Ar fires in the construction of λR(A). By choice of
r , for every rule r ′ ∈ R with r ′ < r it holds that r ′ is a generating rule of A iff Ar ′ fires in
the construction of λR(A). It follows that r is not defeated by any r ′ < r which is applied
in A. However, this r violates the condition of the right hand side, which is a contradiction.
Case 2: r is applied inA. Then, Ar is not applied in the construction of λR(A). A similar
argument shows that r must be defeated by some rule r ′ < r which is applied in A. This
means that r is not applied in A, which is a contradiction. 2
With this result we can show that the behavior observed in Examples 5.1 and 5.2 is not
incidental: our approach actually satisfies the desired principles introduced in Section 3.1.
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Proposition 5.3. The preferred answer set approach satisfies Principles I and II as
described in Section 3.1.
Proof. Principle I: LetR= (R,<R) be a prioritized logic program and letA1 andA2 be
two answer sets of R generated by the (ground) rules R′ ∪ {d1} and R′ ∪ {d2}, respectively.
Moreover, assume that d1 <R d2. We show thatA2 is not a preferred answer set ofR using
the characterization of Proposition 5.1.
Since d1 and d2 are applied in A1 and A2, respectively, their prerequisites must be
provable using the rules in R′. Now assume A2 is a preferred answer set of R. Then A2
is a preferred answer set of some P = (P,<) ∈ FP(R∗). Since the prerequisites of d1 are
in A2 and head(d1) cannot be in A2 due to the well known maximality of answer sets,
Proposition 5.1 implies that d1 is defeated by the head of a rule d in R′ ∪ {d2} with higher
priority than d1. Since we have d1 <R d2 and thus d1 < d2, d can only be in R′. But then
A1 cannot be an answer set of R, contrary to our assumption.
Principle II: Let A be a preferred answer set of a prioritized logic program R =
(P,<R). Then A is a preferred answer set of some P = (P,<) ∈ FP(R∗). Let r be
a rule such that at least one prerequisite of r is not contained in A. Furthermore, let
R′ = (P ∪ {r},<R′) where <R′ agrees with <R on rules in P . Then there exists some
P ′ = (P ∪ {r},<′) ∈ FP(R′∗) such that <′ agrees with < on rules in P . We show that A
is a preferred answer set of P ′ = (P ∪ {r},<′) and thus a preferred answer set ofR′.
Clearly, A is an answer set of P ∪ {r} since γP (A) = γP∪{r}(A) whenever some
prerequisite of r is not in γP (A). Moreover, since A does not contain all prerequisites of r
this rule is not contained in the dual A-reduct of P ′. We thus have CAR′(A)=CAR(A)=
A, that is A is a preferred answer set of P ′. 2
Tracing back the proof of this proposition reveals that the clause “head(rα) ∈ S and rα
defeated by S” is needed in the definition of the sequence Sα in Definition 4.4. It would
have been tempting to omit this clause, and in many cases the resulting modified definition
amounts to the same as the original one. However, there are cases in which the modified,
simpler definition is not satisfactory.
Example 5.3. Consider the following program:
(1) p ← not q
(2) q ← not ¬q
(3) ¬p ← not p
(4) p ← not ¬p
Again, we assume that (i) is preferred over (j) if i < j . The proposed variants of the
definition would select from the answer sets A1 = {p,q} and A2 = {¬p,q} the set A1 as
preferred answer set; however, this violates Principle I. Indeed,A1 has the generating rules
R1 = {(2), (4)} and A2 has the generating rules R2 = {(2), (3)}; thus, by Principle I, A1
must not be preferred over A2. The reason A1 is a preferred answer set according to the
modified definition is that rule (1) fires in the construction of the sequence Sα for S =A1;
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however, this firing is unwanted, since rule (1) is defeated by the answer set which is finally
constructed. This shows that the proposed “simplification” of our definition does not work.
Observe that in the previous example, all rules except (1) correspond to normal default
rules of the form α : β/β in Reiter’s default logic. We remark that the presence of a
nonnormal rule is crucial: if all rules of a program express normal defaults, then the
definition of Sα can be simplified by removing the clause “head(rα) ∈ S and rα defeated
by S”, without changing the semantics.
The following property, which is easily verified, confirms that our reduction of partial
orders to full prioritizations works as intended.
Proposition 5.4. Let <1 and <2 be strict partial orders on a program P such that <2
refines <1, i.e., <1⊆<2. Then, PAS(P,<2)⊆PAS(P,<1).
Thus, as desired, removing priorities between rules does not affect a preferred answer
set of a program and adding additional preference information can never lead to the loss of
a conclusion.
Proposition 5.5. Let R be a collection of ground rules, and let A ∈AS(R) be an answer
set. Then, there exists some well-ordering < of R such that A ∈ PAS(R), where R =
(R,<).
Proof. A suitable well-ordering< can be constructed as follows. Let App be the collection
of all rules r in R which are applied in A, i.e., generating in A. Now let < be an arbitrary
well-ordering of R such that r1 < r2 holds for all r1 ∈ App, r2 ∈ R \ App, i.e., the rules
in App are ordered before all other rules. Then, clearly for every zombie rule r ∈ R with
respect to A, i.e., pre(r)⊆ A, while r is not applied in A and head(r) /∈ A, there is some
rule r ′ < r which is applied in A and head(r ′) defeats r . Hence, by Proposition 5.1, A is a
preferred answer set ofR. 2
An immediate consequence of this property is that prioritized logic programs are a
conservative generalization of extended logic programs.
Corollary 5.6. Let P = (P,<) without priorities, i.e., < is empty. Then, PAS(P) =
AS(P).
Another property is that an inconsistent answer set is insensitive to any rule ordering.
Proposition 5.7. Let P = (P,<) be a prioritized program. If A= Lits is an answer set of
P , then Lits is the unique preferred answer set of P .
Proof. The set Lits is an answer set of P , if and only if Cn(P+) = Lits is inconsistent,
where P+ are the rules in P ∗ without weak negation. Every such rule c← a1, . . . , an
survives the dual reduction, and the literal c is in AP . Hence, for any full prioritization
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P ′ ∈ FP(P∗), clearly λP ′(Lits) = Lits, which implies that Lits is a preferred answer
set. 2
Preferred answer sets are not always unique, even for totally ordered programs.
Example 5.4. Consider the following program:
(1) b ← not ¬b,a
(2) c ← not b
(3) a ← not c
This program has two answer sets: A1 = {a,b} and A2 = {c}. Both are preferred.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that there are also simple programs that have
answer sets but for which no preferred answer set exists.
Example 5.5. Consider the following program:
(1) c ← not b
(2) b ← not a
The single answer set of this program is A= {b}. However, CAP (A)= {c, b} and thus
A is not preferred.
Two views seem possible here: one might say that this is exactly what is expected in a
situation like this; the priorities cannot be satisfied and thus the prioritized program should
be considered inconsistent. This corresponds to a rather strict interpretation of the meaning
of priorities.
However, one might also argue that the preference information should help us in
selecting an answer set from all existing answer sets, but never render an otherwise
consistent program inconsistent. For example, the above program is stratified and thus has
a clear generally accepted semantics in which the evaluation order of the rules is intuitively
determined. The user-defined priority of the second rule over the first one is not compatible
with this natural order, and one might simply ignore it. In the next section, we show how
this view of relaxing priority information can be implemented in our approach.
6. Weakly preferred answer sets
As we have seen in the previous section, there are prioritized programs which have
answer sets, but no preferred answer set, a situation which may be counterproductive in
certain scenarios. To address this problem, we propose a relaxation that gives us exactly
the preferred answer sets whenever they exist and some approximation, called weakly
preferred answer sets, in the other cases.
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Before we present the relaxation we want to point out that there is a price to pay:
consistency preservation turns out to be incompatible with our principles, at least under
rather natural conditions for approximating answer sets. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. Let Rel be a relaxation of the notion of preferred answer sets, that is a
function assigning to each prioritized ground rule baseR a subset of AS(R) such that:
(1) Rel(R)=PAS(R) whenever PAS(R) 6= ∅, and
(2) Rel(R) 6= ∅ wheneverAS(R) 6= ∅.
Defining the preferred belief sets ofR as Rel(R) violates Principle II from Section 3.1.
Proof. Consider Example 5.5. The program, let us call it P , has a single answer set
A = {b} which, according to clause (2) in the proposition, is contained in Rel(P). Let
P ′ be P extended by the rule d = a← c with highest priority. Note that d’s prerequisite
is not in A. Nevertheless, according to clause (1), A /∈ Rel(P ′) since P ′ has the single
preferred answer set {a, c}. Principle II is thus violated. 2
This shows that we will have to trade satisfaction of Principle II for consistency of the
semantics. We remark that technically, some preference Rel which satisfies Principle I can
always be constructed in the case of a finite R, though such a preference need not be
appealing in general. In the infinite case, no such preference may exist, if generating rules
are understood to use assumptions in the body.
The basic idea of our relaxation is to consider in the comparison of answer sets the
degree to which preferences are violated. Intuitively, the degree depends on how much of
the current priority information has to be changed in order to obtain a preferred answer
set. To measure this appropriately, we need a suitable notion of distance between two well-
orderings of the same set.
With an eye on our application, we may consider the distance from a well-ordering<1 of
a set M to another well-ordering<2 of M as the number of pairs m,m′ such that m<1 m′
but m′ <2 m, i.e., the number of violations (or inversions) of the ordering<2 in <1.
Example 6.1. Consider M = {a,b, c, d} and the two orderings c <1 a <1 d <1 b and
a <2 b <2 c <2 d ; then the pairs (c, a), (c, b), and (d, b) are the inversions of <2 in <1.
What we want to do amounts to counting these inversions in a way. This leads us to the
following definition.
Definition 6.1. Let <1 and <2 be well-orderings of the set M with corresponding
enumerations (M,<1) = {rα}<1 and (M,<2) = {sβ}<2 , respectively. Denote by Inv(<1,
<2) the set of all inversions of <2 in <1, and let Vβ(<1,<2) denote the well-ordering
induced by <1 on the set{
rα | rα <1 sβ, (rα, sβ) ∈ Inv(<1,<2)
}
,
i.e., the elements of M which are in <1 before the element sβ and in <2 after sβ .
Then, the distance from <1 to <2, denoted d(<1,<2), is defined as the ordinal
d(<1,<2)=
∑
β<ord(<2)
ord
(
Vβ(<1,<2, )
)
.
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In the previous example, we have Inv(<1,<2)= {(c, a), (c, b), (d, b)} and V0(<1,<2)
= c, V1(<1,<2) = c < d, V2(<1,<2) = ∅, and V3(<1,<2) = ∅; hence, d(<1,<2) =
1+ 2+ 0+ 0= 3.
The definition of d(<1,<2) involves ordinal arithmetic, which may be less familiar
to the reader; see, e.g., [66] for a detailed treatment. Informally, addition α + β of
ordinals amounts to appending an ordering of type β to an ordering of type α. Note that
ordinal arithmetic generalizes familiar integer arithmetic to the infinite, and has different
properties. For example, 1 + ω = ω, which is different from ω + 1; hence, addition of
ordinals is not commutative in general.
The value of d(<1,<2) is indeed well-defined, as every element of the infinite sum is
an ordinal and the sequence is well-founded; for such sums, the result is an ordinal [66].
Intuitively, ord(Vβ(<1,<2)) is the number of violations of the priority of the element sβ
which is at position β in <2, and d(<1,<2) counts in a way all these violations. Counting
them is easy if the underlying setM is finite, while it is not in the infinite case. The problem
is that in the latter case, the order in which a collection of ordinals is summed matters in
general; the result may even be undefined. Our selection in the definition of d(<1,<2)
is driven by our application, and sums the violations in order of decreasing position with
respect to the violated ordering <2.
In general, d(<1,<2) is a transfinite ordinal which is bounded by ord(<1) · ord(<2).
Thus, if the underlying set is countable (as in our application), then d(<1,<2) is countable.
Example 6.2. Suppose we have ground atoms p and q(a), q(f (a)), . . . which are ordered
as follows:
<1: p,q(a), q(f (a)), q(f (f (a))), . . .
<2: q(a), q(f (a)), q(f (f (a))), . . .p.
Then, d(<1,<2)= 1+ 1+ · · · + 0= ω; for every q-atom, there is one violation of <2 in
<1, and no violation for atom p. On the other hand, d(<2,<1)= ω+ 0+ 0+ · · · = ω; the
ordering <2 has ω many violations of the ordering of p in <1, and no violations for the
q-atoms.
Clearly, d(<,<)= 0 holds for any well-ordering <, while symmetry does not hold in
general. For example, consider the following orderings of ground atoms p(x), q(x) over
terms a,f (a), . . . :
<1: p(a),p(f (a)),p(f (f (a))), . . . , q(a), q(f (a)), q(f (f (a))), . . .
<2: p(a), q(a),p(f (a)), q(f (a)),p(f (f (a))), q(f (f (a))), . . .
i.e., <1 orders first, increasing by depth, all atoms p(f i(a)) and then all atoms q(f i(a)),
while <2 orders all atoms by depth and breaks ties by preferring p-atoms over q-atoms;
thus, ord(<1)= ω+ω= 2ω and ord(<2)= ω. We have
d(<1,<2)= 0+ω+ 0+ω+ 0+ω+ · · · = ω2,
while
d(<2,<1)= 0+ 1+ 2+ · · · + 0+ 0+ 0+ · · · = ω.
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If we wish, we can make the distance symmetric by choosing the smaller of d(<1,<2) and
d(<2,<1). Or, we cast d(<,<′) to its associated cardinal; this is sufficient to make the
distance symmetric for our application. In particular, for finite distance values, symmetry
is automatically given.
Proposition 6.2. Let<1,<2 be well-orderings of the same setM such that d(<1,<2) < ω
is finite. Then, d is symmetric on (<1,<2), i.e., d(<2,<1)= d(<1,<2).
Proof. Clearly, Inv(<2,<1) = {(m,m′) | (m′,m) ∈ Inv(<1,<2)}. Observe that if d(<1,
<2) is finite, then only finitely many Vβ(<1,<2) are nonempty, and each of them is finite.
It follows that also only finitely many nonempty Vα(<2,<1) exist, and each of them is
finite; thus, also d(<2,<1) is finite. Since d(<1,<2) is finite, d(<1,<2) amounts to the
number of elements in Inv(<1,<2); since |Inv(<2,<1)| = |Inv(<1,<2)| and d(<2,<1) is
finite, it follows d(<1,<2)= d(<2,<1). 2
Corollary 6.3. On the full prioritizations of a ground rule base, the distance measure
d ′ which is defined by d ′(<1,<2) = card(d(<1,<2)), where card(α) is the cardinal
associated with the ordinal α, is symmetric.
Proof. If d(<1,<2) is finite, this holds by the previous proposition. If d(<1,<2) is
infinite, then also d(<2,<1) is infinite, and since ord(<1) and ord(<2) are countable,
both d(<1,<2) 6 ord(<1) · ord(<2) and d(<2,<1)6 ord(<2) · ord(<1) are countable;
hence, card(d(<1,<2))= card(d(<2, <1))=ℵ0. 2
Note that using d ′ is particularly useful, if we want to avoid a fine-grained distinction of
priority violation and we are only interested whether a finite or infinite number of priority
violations is present; d ′(<1,<2) is either finite or ℵ0, the smallest uncountable cardinal.
The value of d(<1,<2) has an alternative, transformation-based interpretation which
intuitively alludes to the amount of work that is needed in order to transform the ordering
<1 into the ordering <2; Vβ(<1,<2) says how many elements rα must be moved behind
sβ . In particular, in the finite case, d(<1,<2) amounts to the smallest number of successive
switches of neighbored elements which are needed to transform <1 into <2. In fact, this
is precisely the number of switches executed by the well known bubble-sort algorithm. 4
For example, for the orderings c <1 a <1 d <1 b and a <2 b <2 c <2 d from Example 6.1,
bubble-sort performs three switchings in sorting <1 into <2 (c with a, d with b, and c
with b); this yields d(<1,<2) = 3. In the infinite case, a similar interpretation does not
apply in all cases; we come back to a transformational view of distance at the end of this
section.
It can be checked that d verifies all axioms of a standard metric in the finite case, i.e.,
d(<,<)= 0, d(<1,<2)= d(<2,<1), and d(<1,<3) 6 d(<1,<2)+ d(<2,<3).
4 Recall that bubble-sort runs through the list of elements and switches neighbored elements which are in the
wrong order; this process is repeated, until the list is sorted.
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With the above notion of distance from one well-ordering to another, we can weaken the
definition of preferred answer sets as follows.
Definition 6.2. Let R = (R,<) be a partially ordered ground rule base, and let A ∈
AS(R). The preference violation degree of A in R, denoted pvdR(A), is the minimum
distance possible from any full prioritization of R to any fully prioritized rule base
R′ = (R,<′) such that A is a preferred answer set ofR′, i.e.,
pvdR(A)=min
{
d(<1,<2) | (R,<1) ∈FP(R),A ∈PAS(R,<2)
}
.
Moreover, let pvd(R)=minA∈AS(R) pvdR(A) be the preference violation degree of R.
For any answer set A of a prioritized program P = (P,<), the preference violation
degree of A in P , denoted pvdP (A), is defined as pvdP (A) = pvdP∗(A), and the
preference violation degree of P , denoted pvd(P), is pvd(P)= pvd(P∗).
Note that pvdR(A) is indeed well-defined. This is a consequence of Proposition 5.5,
which says that for every answer set A there exists a total ordering of the rules such that A
is preferred.
Based on the definition of preference violation degree, we formalize the concept of
weakly preferred answer sets as follows:
Definition 6.3. Let P = (P,<) be a prioritized logic program. Then, an answer set A of
P is a weakly preferred answer set of P if and only if pvdP (A)= pvd(P). By WAS(P)
we denote the collection of all weakly preferred answer sets of P .
Example 6.3. Consider the following program P :
(1) a ← not c
(2) c ← not b
(3) ¬d ← not b
(4) b ← not ¬b,a
This program has two answer sets, namely A1 = {a,b} and A2 = {c,¬d}; however,
none of them is preferred. We have pvdP (A1) = 2, because (2) and (3) are zombie rules
which can be defeated only by (4), which must be moved in front of these rules; this
takes two switches. On the other hand, we have pvdP (A2) = 1, since the single zombie
rule (1) is defeated if (2) is moved in front of it (note that (4) is a dead rule for A2). Hence,
pvd(P)= 1, and A2 is the weakly preferred answer set of P .
The following results are easily verified.
Proposition 6.4. Let P = (P,<) be a prioritized logic program. If PAS(P) 6= ∅, then
PAS(P)=WAS(P).
Preferred answer sets are just those with preference violation degree zero.
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Proposition 6.5. Let P = (P,<) be a prioritized logic program. If AS(P) 6= ∅, then
WAS(P) 6= ∅.
Proof. Since every set of ordinals has a minimum, min{pvdP (A) | A ∈ AS(P )} =
pvdP (A) holds for some A ∈AS(P ). Hence, from the definition, A is a weakly preferred
answer set of P . 2
In particular, whenever P has a unique answer set, this set will be weakly preferred.
Let us now turn to the question whether Principles I and II are preserved when we switch
from strongly preferred answer sets to weakly preferred ones. Unfortunately, this is not the
case.
Proposition 6.6. The weakly preferred answer set approach does not satisfy Principle I
from Section 3.1.
Proof. Consider the following program P :
(1) a ← not ¬a (4) c ← not ¬c
(2) ¬a ← not a (5) ¬a ← not b,a
(3) ¬a ← not c, a (6) b ← not b
This program has two answer sets, namely A1 = {a,b, c}, which is generated by R1 =
{(1), (4), (6)}, and A2 = {¬a,b, c}, which is generated by R2 = {(2), (4), (6)}. Assuming
that (i) < (j) if i < j , we have that none of these answer sets is strongly preferred. The
set A2 is a weakly preferred answer set, since after switching rules (1) and (2), A2 is a
preferred answer set (thus pvdP (A2)= 1), while pvdP (A1)= 2 (switch rules (3), (4) and
(5), (6)). Since rule (1) is preferred over (2), by Principle I, A2 must not be selected as a
weakly preferred answer set. 2
The failure of Principle II is immediate from Proposition 6.1. We believe that the use
of weakly preferred answer sets is justifiable even in the light of these properties. In fact,
we have defined the concept as an approximation of preferred answer sets; if no preferred
answer set exists, then we must relax the requirements and this may include Principles I
and II; we trade this for consistency of the semantics.
In the above example programs, we have argued that an answer set A of a program P is
weakly preferred by moving generating rules forward such that all zombies are defeated.
We now establish that this intuitive way of making A weakly preferred is in fact legal. We
start with some formal notions on well-orderings.
A switch on a well-ordering< of a finite set M is a pair s = (i, i + 1) of positions in <
such that 06 i and i + 16 |M|. The result of applying s on <, denoted s(<), is the well-
ordering resulting from <= {rα}< by interchanging ri and ri+1. A switching sequence is
finite sequence σ = s1, s2, . . . , sn of switches, whose application on <, denoted by σ(<),
is defined as
σ(<)= sn
(
sn−1(· · · (s1(<)) · · ·)
);
the length of σ is denoted by |σ |.
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Suppose <′ is a well-ordering of M . Then, <′ can be obtained from < as follows. Let
<−1 be < and denote by <i the ordering resulting from <i−1 by applying the switching
sequence τi , which switches the ith element of <′ from its position ji in <i−1 to position
i , for i = 0, . . . , |M| − 1. Then, <′ is identical to <k , where k = |M| − 1. Observe that
ji > i holds for all i , and that τk is void. The sequence σ = τ1, τ2, . . . , τk is called the
canonical switching sequence of <′. Intuitively, in σ the ordering <′ is built from < by a
kind of reverse bubble-sort, where the next iteration starts at some point in the sequence
<i−1 rather than at its end.
Example 6.4. For the orderings c < a < d < b and a <′ b <′ c <′ d as in Example 6.1,
we have:
i τi <i
−1 — c, a, d, b
0 (0,1) a, c, d, b
1 (2,3), (1,2) a, b, c, d
2 void a,b, c, d
3 void a,b, c, d
Thus, the canonical switching sequence is σ = (0,1), (2,3), (1,2).
The following property is easily seen.
Proposition 6.7. Let σ be the canonical sequence transforming < into <′. Then, |σ | =
d(<,<′).
Proof. Observe that starting from<, each switch in σ reduces the number of inversions for
<′ by one. Hence, the length of σ is the number of inversions of <′ in <, which coincides
with d(<,<′). 2
Let P = (P,<) be a fully prioritized finite ground program, and let A be an answer
set of P . We call a well-ordering <′ such that A is a preferred answer set of (P,<′) and
d(<,<′)= pvdP (A) an optimal ordering for A.
Lemma 6.8. Let A ∈ AS(P), where P = (P,<) is a fully prioritized finite ground
program, and let <′ be an optimal ordering for A. If τi from the canonical switching
sequence σ of <′ is nonvoid, then <i−1 has at position i a nondefeated zombie.
The lemma implies that in the canonical transformation of < into an optimal ordering
<′ of A, we never move a rule to the position i unless there is a nondefeated zombie. The
next result tells us that without loss of generality, we may assume that only a rule defeating
this zombie is moved to this position.
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Theorem 6.9. Let A ∈ AS(P), where P = (P,<) is a fully prioritized finite ground
program. Then, there exists an optimal ordering <′ for A such that τi from the canonical
switching sequence σ of <′ is nonvoid if and only if <i−1 has at position i a nondefeated
zombie z, and every nonvoid τi moves a rule defeating z to position i .
The first part of this theorem follows from the previous lemma, while the second is
established by modifying an optimal ordering such that only rules defeating zombies
are moved. As a consequence, a weakly preferred answer set of (P,<) can be obtained
by eliminating all nondefeated zombies through moving generating rules defeating
them ahead as economically as possible. This justifies the informal argumentation in
Example 6.3 and the proof of Proposition 6.1.
Notice, however, that it is not true that a rule defeating a zombie is moved to position i
in every optimal ordering for A.
Example 6.5. Consider the following program P :
(1) a ← not b
(2) c ←
(3) b ←
where (1) < (2) < (3). The set A = {b, c} is the unique answer set of P , and both
(3) <′ (1) <′ (2) and (2) <′′ (3) <′′ (1) are optimal orderings for A; however, τ ′′0 = (0,1)
in the canonical switching sequence σ ′′ = (0,1), (1,2) of <′′ moves (2) to position 0,
which does not defeat the zombie (1).
We conclude this section with some comments on possible alternative ways to define
weakly preferred answer sets. First, let us remark that a distance measure between well-
orderings may be defined which is strictly guided by a transformation-oriented view, based
on a proper formalization of the notion of switch. The distance from <1 to <2 can then
be chosen as the shortest sequence which transforms <1 into <2. However, the formal
definition is, due to the need for executing transfinite switches in general, more involved
than the one from above. In several cases, the measures do coincide, but there are cases
in which the transformation-based distance value is not very intuitive. For example, in
Example 6.2, the transformation-based distance from <1 to <2 would be ω, since we
must move atom p with a transfinite switch in ω many steps behind all other atoms; the
distance from <2 to <1 would be ω2, however, since we must first move q(a) behind p,
then q(f (a)), and so on; this needs ω many transfinite switches, i.e., ω2 switches in total.
However, this value is not very appealing. We therefore prefer the simpler function for
measuring the distance from above.
Our approach takes the view that the quality of the approximation of a preferred answer
set is given by the number of preference violations, and we do not distinguish between
violations of high priority and low priority. In particular, it may be the case that a single
violation is present, and regardless of whether this violation involves the two top-ranked
rules or the two bottom-ranked ones, this violation counts the same.
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An alternative, strictly hierarchic view of violations would be considering the first
violation of the priority ordering as decisive for how far two orderings are from each other.
Then, an answer set is selected, if the highest priority violation compared to a preferred
answer set occurs as late as possible, i.e., it is possible to keep the ordering of priorities
as long as possible. However, this approach has some drawbacks. In the infinite case, the
existence of a weakly preferred answer set is a priori not guaranteed, since no longest
sequence of obeyed priorities might exist. Another aspect is that a single violation may
weigh more than a large—even infinite—number of other violations; it is questionable
whether this is satisfactory in certain situations. These considerations led us to not consider
such an approach to weakly preferred answer sets here.
An intermediate approach, which actually generalizes both approaches discussed above
would be assigning penalties to the violation of priorities, and selecting the answer sets
which have the smallest penalty. However, this approach requires knowledge about how
priority violations should be mapped into penalty values, and it is often not clear how
such values should be reasonably assigned. For this reason, we believe that currently the
development of such a framework is not a major issue.
7. Algorithms and computational complexity
In this section, we address the issue of computing preferred and weakly preferred answer
sets, and analyze the complexity of the main computational tasks in this context.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of complexity theory;
[35,53] are good sources. For a background on complexity results in logic programming,
refer to [17,22,64]. In our analysis, we focus on the case of finite propositional (ground)
prioritized programs, but we will also address nonground programs.
We briefly recall the definitions of the complexity classes that we need for assessing
the complexity of preferred and weakly preferred answer sets. P (respectively, NP) is the
class of decision problems, i.e., Yes/No problems, which are solvable in polynomial time
on a deterministic (respectively, nondeterministic) Turing machine; the class PNP (also
denoted 1p2 ) contains the decision problems solvable on a deterministic Turing machine
in polynomial time with access to an oracle for problems in NP; PNP[O(logn)] (alias
1
p
2 [O(logn)],2p2 [70]) denotes the subclass of PNP in which the oracle access is limited to
O(logn)many queries, where n is the size of the problem input. As usual, for a complexity
class C, the class of the complementary problems is denoted by co-C; note that co-P= P,
co-PNP[O(logn)] = PNP[O(logn)], and co-PNP = PNP. The inclusion relationship of these
classes is shown in Fig. 1; each inclusion is widely believed to be proper.
Fig. 1. Relationship of complexity classes.
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For measuring the complexity of computational problems with output, we use the
concept of a search problem, in which an arbitrary solution out of a set of possible solutions
must be computed; here, a Turing machine has an output tape whose contents is the result
of the computation if the machine halts in an accepting state. In case of a nondeterministic
machine, output of different solutions in different runs is admissible. The search analogues
of the decisional classes P, NP, PNP etc. are prefixed by “F”.
7.1. Preferred answer sets
Of course, since extended logic programs without priorities are a special case of
prioritized programs, all lower complexity bounds for answer sets of extended logic
programs carry over to preferred answer sets. In particular, by the complexity results on
the stable models of a general propositional logic program P [7,46,47] and the obvious
correspondence between the preferred answer sets of the prioritized program P = (P,<),
where < is empty (cf. Corollary 5.6) and the stable models of P , we obtain that deciding
whether a prioritized program has a preferred answer set is NP-hard, and, moreover, that
inference of a literal from all preferred answer sets of a prioritized program is a co-NP-hard
problem.
Natural questions are now whether preferred answer sets are harder than answer
sets in general and, moreover, how the complexity is affected if we have programs
with a particular priority ordering. Intuitively, the many possible total refinements of a
partial ordering < on the rules are a source of complexity; since a full prioritization
unambiguously fixes the order in which the rules have to be considered, we might expect
that for fully prioritized programs the complexity is lower than for general programs.
This intuition may be nurtured by the fact that in some nonmonotonic formalisms, full
prioritization decreases complexity, cf. [49].
The first result is that priorities do fortunately not increase the complexity of extension
checking for a program, i.e., given a set A of literals and a prioritized programP , deciding
whether this set constitutes a preferred answer set of the program. We first note that this
holds in the case where the program is fully prioritized. The result can be derived from
known results and an inspection of the definitions.
Proposition 7.1. Given a fully prioritized (finite) propositional program P = (P,<)
and a set A ⊆ Lits, both deciding whether A ∈ AS(P ) and A ∈ PAS(P) is possible
in polynomial time. Moreover, these problems are complete for P (under logspace-
reductions).
We have added in this proposition the matching lower bound of the complexity,
to sharply characterize the computational properties of preferred extension checking;
P-completeness of this problem tells us, adopting a general belief in the complexity theory
community, that this problem is not amenable to parallelization.
For deriving an analogous result in the case of arbitrary rather than full prioritization,
we note the following key lemma. Recall that we have divided in Section 4 the rules of
a prerequisite-free prioritized program P = (P,<) with respect to an answer set A into
generating rules (those which are applied in A), dead rules (those which are not applicable
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Examples of graph G(P,A) (transitive edges are omitted).
in A, but the head is from A), and zombie rules (those which are not applicable in A, and
whose head is not in A), and that only zombie rules can prevent preference of A.
For a propositional prioritized program P = (P,<) and A ∈ AS(P), we construct a
labeled directed graph G(P,A) as follows. The vertices are the rules P , and an edge is
directed from r to r ′ if r < r ′. Moreover, label each vertex r as follows: if the dual reduct
Ar is a generating rule of AP , then label r with “g”; if Ar is a zombie rule, then label r
with “z”; otherwise, i.e., Ar is a dead rule or r vanishes in the dual reduction, then label r
with “i” (for irrelevant). Fig. 2 shows some examples.
From G, we construct a full prioritization P ′ = (P,<′) of P which proves that A is a
preferred answer set, by employing a modified topological sorting procedure as follows.
Algorithm FULL-ORDER
Input: Propositional prioritized program P = (P,<), answer set A ∈AS(P).
Output: Full prioritization P ′ ∈FP(P) such that A ∈PAS(P ′), if A ∈ PAS(P);
otherwise, “no”.
Method:
Step 1. Construct graphG=G(P,A), and initialize T := ∅, <′:= ∅.
Step 2. If G is empty, then output P ′ = (P,<′) and halt;
Step 3. Pick any source of G, i.e., a vertex r which has no incoming edges, such that
either r is not labeled “z”, or r is defeated by T ; if no such r exists, then output
“no” and halt.
Step 4. If r is labeled “g”, then set T := T ∪ {h(r)}, where h(r) is the head of r;
Step 5. Remove r from G, and continue at Step 2.
Notice that this algorithm is nondeterministic, since in Step 1, in general different
vertices r can be selected, which leads to different outputs.
Example 7.1. Consider the prioritized program P which is represented by the graph
G(P,A1) in Fig. 2(a), and the answer set A1. In Step 3 of FULL-ORDER, (1) and (2)
are sources; since (1) is labeled “g” and (2) is labeled “z” but not defeated by T = ∅, the
algorithm selects (1) and sets in step 4 T := {a}. In the next iteration, rule (2) is the only
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source and selected, as it is now defeated by T ; T is not updated. In the next iteration,
rule (3) is the only source; however, (3) is labeled “z” and not defeated by T = {a}.
Thus, the algorithm outputs “no” and halts. Observe that A1 is not a preferred answer set
of P .
Now consider the reordered program P1 represented by the graph in Fig. 2(b), and the
answer set A2. In Step 3, rules (1) and (2) are the sources; (2) is selected and T := {¬a} in
Step 4. Thereafter, rule (1) is selected, as it is now defeated by T . In the next round, both
(3) and (4) are selectable; suppose (4) is selected first, which results in T := {¬a, c}, and
thereafter (3) is selected (which leaves T unchanged). Now, both (5) and (6) are selectable;
suppose (5) is chosen and finally (6), which effects the update T := {¬a,b, c}. Since G
is empty now, the algorithm outputs P ′1, where (2) <′ (1) <′ (4) <′ (3) <′ (5) <′ (6) and
halts. As easily checked, A2 is a preferred answer set of P1.
The next lemma states that the algorithm works in fact properly.
Lemma 7.2. Let P be a propositional prioritized program, and let A ∈ AS(P). Then,
A ∈ PAS(P), if and only if some execution of FULL-ORDER outputs a fully prioritized
program P ′. Moreover, P ′ ∈FP(P) and A ∈PAS(P ′) hold for every such P ′, and either
all runs output some P ′, or all output “no”.
Now the previously announced result on recognition of preferred answer sets is not hard
to prove.
Theorem 7.3. Let P = (P,<) be a prioritized finite propositional logic program, and let
A ⊆ Lits. Then, deciding whether A ∈ PAS(P) is polynomial (more precisely, complete
for P).
Proof. By Lemma 7.2,A ∈ PAS(P) can be decided by checking whetherA ∈AS(P) and
running a deterministic variant of FULL-ORDER on P ; the former check is polynomial
(Proposition 7.1), and it is not hard to see that any run of FULL-ORDER is polynomial-
time bounded. Hence, the problem is in P. Hardness for P (under log-space reductions) is
inherited from the subcase of fully prioritized programs (Lemma 7.2). 2
Thus, model checking is polynomial, and priorities do not affect the complexity. We
remark that using proper data structures, algorithm FULL-ORDER can be implemented to
run in linear time. Since also A ∈AS(P) is decidable within the same time, recognition of
a preferred answer set can be done efficiently.
Let us see whether we have a similar behavior for deciding the consistency of a
prioritized program, i.e., the existence of a preferred answer set. As discussed above, this
problem is intractable in the general case, which is inherited from the complexity of stable
models. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the consistency check and
finding some preferred answer set is polynomial, if we have a fully prioritized program;
notice that in case of prerequisite-free programs, there is at most one preferred answer set
(Lemma 4.1). Unfortunately, also in this case, a polynomial time algorithm is unlikely to
be found.
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Theorem 7.4. Given a finite propositional prioritized program P = (P,<), deciding
whether PAS(P) 6= ∅ is NP-complete. The problem is NP-hard even if < is a total order
and P does not involve strong negation.
The proof of this result is by a reduction from the satisfiability problem. We remark
that our reduction is parsimonious [35], i.e., the number of solutions is preserved in the
reduction. This implies that counting the number of preferred answer sets is a difficult
problem. We obtain from Theorems 7.3, 7.4 and well-known results about the satisfiability
problem the following side result. The class #P (see [35]) contains the search problems
for which the number of solutions of each instance can be expressed by the number of
accepting computations of a nondeterministic polynomial time Turing machine.
Corollary 7.5 (Proof of Theorem 7.4). Given a finite propositional fully prioritized pro-
gram P = (P,<), counting the number of preferred answer sets of P is #P-complete.
It is easy to see that in the proof of Theorem 7.4, a satisfying assignment for the clause set
C in the reduction can be easily constructed from any arbitrary preferred answer set of the
program P . Hence, computation of an arbitrary satisfying truth assignment is polynomial-
time reducible to the computation of a preferred answer set. Therefore, we obtain the
following result.
Corollary 7.6 (Proof of Theorem 7.4). Given a finite propositional prioritized program
P = (P,<), computing an arbitrary preferred answer sets of P is FNP-complete.
Finally, let us turn to the problem of inference. We consider here cautious inference; for
brave inference, we obtain dual complexity results.
A literal L is a consequence of a prioritized programP , denoted P |=L, if L belongs to
every preferred answer set of P . The set of all consequences of P is denoted by Cn(P).
Like in many other nonmonotonic systems, also in case of prioritized logic programs the
complexity of inferencing is related to the complexity of consistency, and can be reduced
to the complementary problem. In fact, from Theorem 7.4 it is not difficult to derive the
following result.
Theorem 7.7. Given a finite propositional prioritized program P = (P,<) and a literal
L, deciding whether P |=L is co-NP-complete. The problem is co-NP-hard even if < is a
total order and P does not involve strong negation.
7.2. Weakly preferred answer sets
As we have seen in the previous subsection, adding priorities to programs is computa-
tionally speaking well-behaved, in the sense that selecting preferred answer sets among all
answer sets under consideration does not add to the complexity of the main computational
problems. Let us now see whether this pertains if we consider weakly preferred answer
sets instead of strongly preferred ones.
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As we will see, weak preference increases the complexity of the main computational
tasks on prioritized programs. The reason is that weak preference bears an implicit
NP optimization problem, whose computation is slightly harder than NP. However,
the increase in complexity is rather small and does not lift the problems to higher
regions of the polynomial hierarchy; they stay within the polynomial time closure of
NP, i.e., PNP (respectively, FPNP). A precise account of the decisional problems shows
that they do in fact belong to PNP[O(logn)]; we discuss implications of these results
below.
Recall that an answer set A of a prioritized program P is weakly preferred, if its
preference violation degree pvdP (A) is smallest over the preference violation degrees of
all answer sets of P , i.e., coincides with pvd(P). Thus, for the recognition of a weakly
preferred answer set, the relationship of pvdP (A) to pvd(P) is important.
A natural algorithm for deciding whether A is weakly preferred is the following.
Algorithm REC-WAS
Input: Propositional prioritized program P = (P,<), answer set A ∈AS(P).
Output: “yes”, if A ∈WAS(P); otherwise, “no”.
Method:
Step 1. Compute pvdP (A);
Step 2. Compute pvd(P);
Step 3. If pvdP (A)= pvd(P), then output “yes”, otherwise output “no”.
This algorithm calls subroutines for computing pvdP (A) and pvd(P), which must be
refined. For this aim, let us first see over which values the preference violation degree may
range.
As discussed in Section 6, for a fully prioritized programP = (P,<) the value pvdP (A)
amounts to the smallest number of switches of neighbored rules in < such that A is a
preferred answer set of the resulting program P ′ = (P,<′); Moreover, we know from
Proposition 6.5 that such a switching is always possible.
For the smallest number of switches, |P |2 is an obvious upper bound. This bound can
be tightened to
s = |P | − 1+ |P | − 2+ · · · + 1= |P |(|P | − 1)/2=O(|P |2),
which is the maximal number of switches performed by bubble sort when it sorts the input
ordered by < into <′. Thus, pvdP (A), and hence also pvd(P) ranges over the segment
[0, s] of the integers.
In terms of a decision problem, the problem of computing pvdP (A) can be rephrased as
deciding whether pvdP (A) is smaller than a given bound k. If a procedure for solving this
problem is available, then we can actually compute pvdP (A) in a binary search over [0, s].
As it turns out, deciding whether pvdP (A)6 k is a problem in NP. Thus, we can compute
pvdP (A) by making O(log |P |2) many calls to an NP oracle.
The value of pvd(P) can be computed similarly, if a subroutine solves the problem
whether pvd(P)6 k holds; also the latter problem is in NP. We thus obtain the following
result.
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Proposition 7.8. Given a finite propositional prioritized program P = (P,<) and A ∈
AS(P ), computing pvdP (A) is in F1p2 [O(logn)], i.e., possible in polynomial time with
O(logn) many oracle queries, where n is the input size. Moreover, also computing pvd(P)
is in F1p2 [O(logn)].
A more precise account of computing pvdP (A) and pvd(P) shows that the problems are
complete for subclasses of F1p2 [O(logn)] under appropriate reductions, but we are less
interested in such results here.
Thus, in the light of Proposition 7.8, we obtain that algorithm REC-WAS can be
implemented such that it runs in polynomial time while making O(logn) accesses to an NP
oracle. As a consequence, recognition of a weakly preferred answer set is in PNP[O(logn)].
The question is whether this rather straightforward upper bound can be improved by a more
sophisticated algorithm, e.g., by one which uses only a constant number of calls to an NP-
oracle, or, even an NP style guess-and-check algorithm. The next theorem tells us that the
PNP[O(logn)] upper bound is paralleled by a matching lower bound, and hence such an
improved algorithm is unlikely to exist.
Theorem 7.9. Given a prioritized propositional programP = (P,<) and a setA⊆ Lits of
ground literals, deciding whether A ∈WAS(P) is PNP[O(logn)]-complete. Hardness for
PNP[O(logn)] holds even if < is a total ordering and P does not contain strong negation.
The proof of the hardness part of this theorem, in particular under the asserted restriction,
is rather technical and exploits particular properties of the distance measure d(<,<′) from
the definition of weakly preferred answer sets. Let us try to give an intuitive account of
why the problem is that complex, even if the rules are fully prioritized.
For determining pvdP (A) of any answer set A of P , we must switch as few rules in <
as possible such that A becomes a preferred answer set; this means that some appropriate
generating rule r ′ must be moved in front of every zombie rule r which is not defeated
along the ordering<. However, in general several generating rules r ′ for defeating r exist;
moving the “right” generating rules such that the overall switching cost is minimal amounts
to an optimization problem, which does not have a unique solution in general. For example,
consider the following simple program:
(1) b ← not a,not c
(2) c ←
(3) e ← not a,not d
(4) a ←
(5) d ←
Assuming as usual that (i) < (j) for i < j , after moving c← in front of (1) and d← in
front of (3), the unique answer set A = {a, c, d} is preferred. However, moving a← in
front of (1) is another possibility for making A preferred; both possibilities require three
switches. In a more complicated setting, overlapping possibilities must be combined, which
turns out to be difficult. Indeed, deciding whether a certain number of rule switches is
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sufficient for turning an answer set A into a preferred answer set is an intractable problem.
(Observe that if computing the value of pvdP (A) for anyAwere polynomial, then deciding
A ∈WAS(P) would be in co-NP.)
Before we turn to the inference problem, let us consider the problem of actually
computing a weakly preferred answer set, rather than recognizing it. It is not hard to
see that given a prioritized logic program P , we can compute a weakly preferred answer
set of P in polynomial time with the help of an NP oracle, i.e., the problem is in FPNP.
Indeed, the problem can be solved by computing first pvd(P), and then constructing some
A ∈WAS(P) by stepwise extending a partial weakly preferred answer set A′ using the
oracle. More formally, this algorithm is as follows.
Algorithm COMPUTE-WAS
Input: Propositional prioritized program P = (P,<).
Output: Some A ∈WAS(P), ifWAS(P) 6= ∅; otherwise, “no”.
Method:
Step 1. Check if AS(P)= ∅; if true, then output “no” and halt, else compute pvd(P),
and set A := ∅, S := Lits;
Step 2. If S = ∅, then output A and halt, else choose some L ∈ S;
Step 3. Check if some A′ ∈WAS(P) exists such that A∪ {L} ⊆A′; if true, then set
A :=A∪ {L};
Step 4. Set S := S \ {L}, and continue at Step 2.
It is easily seen that this algorithm is correct. Moreover, the checks in Steps 1 and 3 are in
NP; in Step 3, this is true because if pvd(P) is known, together with A′ a polynomial-size
proof of the fact that A′ ∈WAS(P) can be guessed and verified in polynomial time.
The reader might guess that computing a weakly preferred answer set is complete for
FPNP; however, this intuition is elusive, and there is no evidence of this fact. The reason
is that intuitively, in the second phase of algorithm COMPUTE-WAS (Steps 2–4) the
access to the NP oracle has much of a deterministic reconstruction of a nondeterministic
computation, in which, given P and pvd(P), a weakly preferred answer set A ∈WAS(P)
may be guessed and verified in polynomial time. The above algorithm deterministically
reconstructs a successful guess for A step by step; intuitively, the oracle accesses in this
phase are “weak” in a sense. On the other hand, the ones in the first phase (Step 1) are
“strong”, since computing pvd(P) requires the full power of O(logn) many oracle calls.
Overall, in total only O(logn)many strong oracle accesses are made. Problems of a similar
characteristics are not known to be complete for FPNP.
From these observations, one may next guess that the problem is probably in
FPNP[O(logn)], if we do some clever packing of oracle calls in phase two such that
O(logn) overall oracle calls are sufficient. Unfortunately, this intuition is elusive; in fact,
even if the optimal preference violation degree pvd(P) is known, it is not clear how to
construct a weakly preferred answer set in polynomial time using only O(logn) many NP
oracle calls.
The precise complexity of computing a weakly preferred answer set can be assessed
in terms of the less familiar complexity class FNP//OptP[O(logn)] introduced in [15,16].
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This class contains the search problems such that for each instance I , an arbitrary solution
for I can be computed by a nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, if the
machine receives as additional input the value g(I) of a fixed function g from the class
OptP[O(logn)]; the latter class contains all functions f , whose value f (x) has O(logn)
many bits, where n is the size of x , and such that f (x) can be obtained as the “optimal”
(i.e., minimal or maximal) value computed by some nondeterministic polynomial-time
Turig machine in all runs on input x . Well-known problems in OptP[O(logn)] are, e.g.,
computing the size of a maximum clique in a graph, or computing the size of a smallest
vertex cover for a graph (i.e., a subset of the vertices which meets each edge). The precise
technical definition of FNP//OptP[O(logn)] can be found in [16]. Notice that few natural
problems complete for this class are known.
It is easy to see that computing an arbitrary weakly preferred answer set of a
propositional prioritized program P = (P,<) belongs to the class FNP//OptP[O(logn)].
Indeed, the function pvd(P) is in OptP[O(logn)] (with obvious extensions for the
case where P has no weakly preferred answer sets), and if pvd(P) is known, a full
prioritization P ′ = (P,<′) of P and an A ∈ PAS(P ′) such that d(<,<′) 6 pvd(P) can
be nondeterministically generated and verified in polynomial time. On the other hand, it
can be shown that computing a weakly preferred answer set for P is among the hardest
problems in FNP//OptP[O(logn)].
Theorem 7.10. Given a prioritized propositional program P = (P,<), computing an
arbitrary A ∈WAS(P) is complete for FNP//OptP[O(logn)]. Hardness holds even if < is
a total ordering and P does not contain strong negation.
Let us finally consider the inference problem. Analogous to inference from preferred
answer sets, we say that a literal L is a weak consequence of a prioritized program P ,
denoted P |=w L, if L belongs to every weakly preferred answer set of P . We denote by
Cnw(P) the set of all weak consequences of P .
For the problem of inference, we obtain a complexity result analogous to the one for
model checking.
Theorem 7.11. Deciding, given a finite prioritized propositional programP = (P,<) and
a literal L, whetherP |=w L is PNP[O(logn)]-complete. Hardness for PNP[O(logn)] holds
even if < is a total order and P does not have strong negation.
Notice that the proof of the theorem shows that reasoning from weakly preferred answer
sets remains a hard problem, even if all answer sets are known and are part of the problem
input. Thus, theoretically speaking, by first computing all answer sets and then selecting
the weakly preferred ones among them, we might face in the second step still the full
intrinsic complexity of the problem.
The results on weakly preferred answer sets can be interpreted as follows. Informally,
they show that this semantics is amenable to parallelization, if an NP oracle is available.
In fact, it is known that the class PNP[O(logn)] coincides with the class PNP‖ , in which a
polynomial-time bounded Turing machine may access an NP oracle, but all queries must
be prepared before the first call; thus, all oracle queries can be solved in parallel. As a
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consequence, both recognition of a weakly preferred answer set and weak inference from
a prioritized logic program can be parallelized to NP. This can be regarded as a positive
property, even if we lack efficient parallelization hardware for NP problems to date.
For the computation of a weakly preferred answer set, we obtain a similar parallelization
property. However, from the above results it is not known that this problem is in FPNP‖ ,
the search analogue of PNP‖ . In fact, the class FP
NP
‖ is contained in FNP//OptP[O(logn)],
but it is believed that this inclusion is strict. In particular, no FNP//OptP[O(logn)]-
complete problem is known to be in FPNP‖ . Nonetheless, it is known that the problems in
FPNP[O(logn)] are in RP · FPNP‖ , which is a randomized variant of FPNP‖ ; informally, this
class contains the problems for which a solution can be randomly generated with very high
probability in polynomial time, if a call to a problem in FPNP‖ is admitted. Thus, a weakly
preferred answer set can be randomly computed with high probability using parallel NP
oracle calls; since the success probability can be pushed higher than the reliability of
hardware, this is in practice as good as nonrandomized computation.
7.3. Nonground programs
Before closing this section, we briefly address the complexity of preferred and weakly
preferred answer sets for nonground programs.
For function-free programs, the complexities of the decisional problems from above
intuitively increase as usual by one exponential, from P to EXPTIME, NP to NEXPTIME,
etc. A particular interesting case is inference from the weakly preferred answer sets,
however. The complexity increases in this case to the class PSPACENP, i.e., polynomial
space with an oracle for NP, where the oracle space is unbounded. Indeed, the class
PSPACENP is the exponential analogue of LOGSPACENP, and LOGSPACENP coincides
with PNP[O(logn)] (see, e.g., [70]). Notice that that membership algorithm for P |=w L
which we have described in the proof of Theorem 7.11 actually can be implemented
to run in logarithmic space; properly adapted for function-free programs (writing the
ground instance P∗ of the input P to the query tape instead of nonground P), it works
in polynomial space. However, we omit the technical details and do not investigate into
upgrading complexity results; this can be done utilizing the methods developed in [24,33].
For the search problems, we have to respect that the output size is in general exponential
in the input size; the study of respective complexity classes is less developed, and we do
not head in this direction here. However, we may expect that an analogous exponential
complexity increase is present with function-free programs.
For programs with functions, we obtain from the complexity of stable models [45,64,
65] that preferred answer set semantics can express 511-complete sets over the Herbrand
universe generated by the program, and that existence of a preferred answer set can
express 611 -complete sets on this universe. On the other hand 6
1
2 , respectively, 5
1
2 is
an upper bound for deciding existence of a preferred answer set and inference from the
preferred answer sets, respectively; an answer set A with a proper well-ordering < such
that λP (A) = A can be expressed in 612 . It remains to see, however, in which cases the
same upper bounds as for stable models, i.e., 511 and 6
1
1 , can be obtained. For weakly
preferred answer sets, the complexity in the case with functions may be higher. These
interesting issues are left for further study.
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8. An application: Qualitative decision making
In this section we want to discuss how our approach can be used to reduce qualitative
decision making to answering queries to a knowledge base. Assume you want to buy a car.
You have collected the following information about different types of cars:
expensive(Chevrolet), safe(Chevrolet), safe(Volvo),nice(Porsche), fast(Porsche).
Your decision which car to buy is based on different criteria. We can use rules
corresponding to normal defaults [60] in order to represent the properties which you
consider relevant. Let us assume you like fast and nice cars. On the other hand, your budget
does not allow you to purchase a very expensive car. Moreover, you have to take your wife’s
wishes into account, and she insists on a car which is known to be safe.
(1) ¬buy(x) ← not buy(x), expensive(x)
(2) buy(x) ← not ¬buy(x), safe(x)
(3) buy(x) ← not ¬buy(x), nice(x)
(4) buy(x) ← not ¬buy(x), fast(x).
Since buying more than one car is out of the question these different decision criteria
may obviously lead to conflict, and a preference ordering is necessary. Since there is not
much you can do about your restricted budget, rule (1) gets highest preference. Moreover,
since your wife is very concerned about safety you better give (2) higher priority than (3)
and (4). Since there is tremendous traffic on highways in your area, (3) is more important
to you than (4). This means we have
(1) < (2) < (3) < (4).
We still have to represent that you cannot afford more than one car. A straightforward idea
would be to use the rule
(0) ¬buy(y) ← buy(x), x 6= y
with highest priority. Unfortunately, this does not work. The reason is that the high priority
of the instances of this rule would allow us to defeat instances of (2), (3) and (4) even if this
is not intended. In our example we would obtain two preferred answer sets, the intended
one containing buy(Volvo), but also an unintended one (at least from your wife’s point of
view) containing buy(Porsche). In the latter, the instance of (2) with x = Volvo would be
defeated by the instance of (0) with x = Porsche and y = Volvo.
To represent our problem adequately, we have to make sure that the consequences of a
certain decision, namely that certain cars are not purchased, do not have higher priority
than the decision itself, that is, the decision to buy a specific car. Instead of adding the
single rule (0) we therefore represent our criteria for buying a car as pairs of rules. To each
rule of the form
(r) buy(x) ← not¬buy(x), c1(x), . . . , cn(x)
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we add a second one of the form
(r′) ¬buy(y) ← c1(x), . . . , cn(x), buy(x), x 6= y
with the same priority as (r). In our example we have to add
(2′) ¬buy(y) ← safe(x), buy(x), x 6= y
(3′) ¬buy(y) ← nice(x), buy(x), x 6= y
(4′) ¬buy(y) ← fast(x), buy(x), x 6= y
and use the following preferences
(1) <
{
(2), (2′)
}
<
{
(3), (3′)
}
<
{
(4), (4′)
}
.
Given this information we obtain a single preferred answer set containing buy(Volvo).
This leaves you somewhat dissatisfied since you really like the Porsche. You might try
to convince your wife that in case a car is both nice and fast you would have heard about
any safety problems. That is, you would like to add the following pair of rules:
(1.5) buy(x) ← not¬buy(x), not¬safe(x), nice(x), fast(x)
(1.5′) ¬buy(y) ← not¬safe(x), nice(x), fast(x), buy(x), x 6= y
If your wife accepts this rule with preferences {(1.5), (1.5′)}< {(2), (2′)} you are happy
since now the single preferred answer set contains buy(Porsche).
9. Related work
Apart from the approaches in the context of default logic which we have reviewed in
Section 3, several approaches treating preferences in the context of logic programming
have been described in the literature. In this section, we discuss (in alphabetical order) their
relationships to our approach. We also compare our work with a proposal by Delgrande and
Schaub in which prioritized default theories are compiled to standard default theories [18].
Analyti and Pramanik. Yet another semantics for extended logic programs, called
reliable semantics (RS), has been proposed by Analyti and Pramanik in [2]. Their approach
is based upon and generalizes the well-founded semantics of extended logic programs.
The set of consequences is given by its reliable model, which is computable as the least
fixpoint of a monotonic operator. RS was developed to obtain meaningful consequences
from programs that may derive contrary literals L and ¬L, assuming that rules have
different reliability. A strict partial order < is imposed on the rules, where r < r ′ reads
“r is less reliable than r ′”. Each rule r is assigned a suspect set Sr of literals from its body,
and partial models (which may contain weakly negated literals) are subject to constraints
(i.e., rules with empty heads); if applying r violates a constraint, then informally r and
rules deriving a literal in Sr are viewed “suspect” for this violation, and the reliability
ordering is used for resolving the conflict.
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Apparently, the framework of Analyti and Pramanik is quite different from our
prioritized logic programs. Our approach views preference at an abstract level, rather than
as reliability information, and is not tailored as a contradiction removal system. As for the
principles, since RS generalizes the well-founded semantics, it literally violates Principle II
in general; a variant of RS which assigns every program a set of r-stable models also
violates Principle I as follows from a correspondence to partial stable models of normal
logic programs. However, this assessment is not fully appropriate, since reliability of
rules is only relevant for resolving head-conflicts of rules. A proper reformulation of the
Principles I and II for this task remains for further study.
Brewka. In the article [9], one of the authors of the present paper has described a
prioritized version of the well-founded semantics for extended logic programs. In that
paper, the preference information was expressed in the logical language and could thus be
derived dynamically. Here we did not want to complicate matters and used an additional
ordering relation outside the language. However, the representation in the language is not
much more difficult and can be done along the lines of [8]: if preferences are represented
in the language, then an answer set A is preferred if there is a total order< of the program
rules such that < is compatible with the preference information in A and λ<(A) = A.
Intuitively, < is compatible with A if the addition of a syntactic representation of < to A
does not lead to inconsistency.
Buccafurri et al. and Laenens et al. An approach that is closer in spirit to ours is ordered
logic programming, which has been proposed by Laenens and Vermeir [40] and further
developed, e.g., in [12,14,27]. An ordered logic program is a set of components forming
an inheritance hierarchy, where each component consists of a set of rules. The inheritance
hierarchy, which is modeled as a strict partial ordering, is used to settle conflicts among
rules: rules from components lower in the hierarchy have preference over those from
components higher up in the hierarchy, since the former components are considered more
specific. Different semantics of ordered logic programs, akin to the standard semantics
of traditional logic programming have been made; in particular, an appealing definition
of a stable model for an ordered logic program was given in [12]. There are two main
differences between ordered logic programs and our approach:
(1) The preferences of ordered logic programs are predefined through the inheritance
hierarchy.
(2) Ordered logic programs provide only one kind of negation, namely strong negation.
Negation as failure is not in the language, but can be simulated by using special
predicates and additional components on the hierarchy [14].
(3) On the other hand, disjunctive ordered logic programs [14] allow disjunction in rule
heads, which has not been considered in this paper (our approach can be easily
extended to this case, though).
As for the Principles I and II, Buccafurri et al. report that ordered logic programming and
its extension with disjunction satisfy these principles, recast to the framework of disjunctive
ordered logic [14].
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Delgrande and Schaub. A further approach for adding priorities to default theories has
been presented by Delgrande and Schaub [18]. A set of default rules D, a background
classical theory W , and a preference ordering < (which is a strict partial ordering) on the
default rules are transformed into a standard Reiter [60] default theory T = (D′,W ′), by
naming the defaults and introducing special purpose predicates. The latter include a binary
predicate ≺(δ, δ′) for expressing priority information, ok(δ) for controlling application of
rule δ, bl(δ) for expressing that δ is blocked, and ap(δ) for expressing that δ is applied. The
control of rule application is expressed by a first-order formula in W ′, which essentially
states that consideration (i.e., potential application) of a rule δ is ok (represented by ok(δ)),
if every rule δ′ which has higher priority is either applied or blocked (expressed by facts
ap(δ′) and bl(δ′), respectively, each of which can only be derived if ok(δ′) is true). The
extensions of the ordered default theory (W,D,<) are the extensions of T , restricted
to the language of (W,D); these are always extensions of the unordered default theory
(W,D). An extended approach allows for dynamic preferences similar as in [32,58,63,71],
by supporting the explicit representation of preference information between defaults in W
and D.
Delgrande and Schaub’s proposal is different from ours. Like Gelfond and Son [32],
they translate priorities into the object language of a nonprioritized underlying formalism,
rather than treating priorities at the meta-level. The naming of defaults and use of first-order
domain closure axioms as described in [18] assume a finite set of defaults. Furthermore,
we reduce a partial ordering to all well-orderings for defining preferred answer sets, which
is not the case in the approach of Delgrande and Schaub, where preferred extensions are
constructed using the priority information just as given by <.
As for our Principles I and II, it appears (Schaub, personal communication) that they are
both satisfied by the approach of Delgrande and Schaub. Observe, however, that they treat
priorities as second-class entities, while other approaches, including ours, handle priorities
as first-class entities. In the group of the latter considered in this paper, our approach to
preferred answer sets is the only one which satisfies both Principles I and II.
Moreover, Delgrande and Schaub do not obtain satisfactory results in all cases. This is
shown, e.g., by the default theory in Example 3.1 from Section 3.2, where Schaub and
Delgrande select no extension; this is counterintuitive, since E1 = Th({a,b}) is expected
to be preferred. Similarly, no extension is selected for the variant of the birds & penguins
example described in the next paragraph, if the priorities (3) < (4) < (5) are adopted.
An intuitive explanation for this behavior is that Delgrande and Schaub’s approach can
be viewed as a “one-pass” test on an extension E in which the rules are considered in
the order of decreasing priorities. If a rule is encountered which is neither applicable nor
blocked, then the extension E is rejected. On the other hand, we use a kind of look-ahead
strategy, in which a rule of lower priority may be applied to establish the precondition of a
yet inapplicable rule. This way, intuitively more extensions can be accepted. The previous
examples show that in the framework of Delgrande and Schaub dependencies between
rules must be carefully respected for assigning priorities.
Gelfond and Son. In a recent paper, Gelfond and Son have also tackled the problem
of adding priorities on defaults expressing normality in the language of extended logic
programs [32]. Similar to [18,58,63,72], their approach foresees the specification of
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preference over rules in the object language. An important difference to our approach is that
rules are, similar as in [52,58,63], divided into definite rules and default (defeasible) rules.
While definite rules must be strictly obeyed, default rules may be ignored if reasonable in
a given context.
Gelfond and Son’s approach has a multi-sorted logical language which has constants
for individuals, definite rules, and default rules for expressing statements of the form “If
l1, . . . , lm are true, then normally l0 is true”, functions and relations for the domain as
well as special predicates for defining rules and expressing preference. For example, the
previous default rule is expressed by the formula
default(d, l0, [l1, . . . , lm]),
where d is the name of the default rule; here, [l1, . . . , lm] is Prolog-like list notation.
Informally, this default amounts to the rule l0 ← l1, . . . , lm,not¬l0 in extended logic
programming. Moreover, the language allows to express that two default rules conflict
(e.g., default rules with opposite literals in the head may be declared as conflicting). Like
preferences, conflicts can be declared dynamically by means of rules.
The semantics of the language is defined in terms of a transformation of any program
P into an extended logic program t (P) whose answer sets are, roughly speaking, cast
into answer sets of the program P . The transformation is basically a meta-interpreter for
programs. Further extensions of the language by allowing defeasible literals in bodies of
default rules and exceptions to defaults are discussed.
An important feature of Gelfond and Son’s approach is an explicit distinction between
provability by default and “strong” provability in the construction of an answer set; a literal
is strongly provable, if it is provable from definite rules (whose application requires that
all literals in the body are strongly provable), and a literal is provable by default, if it is
provable from default rules, where the rule bodies hold by default.
By this feature, Gelfond and Son’s approach and ours are fundamentally different in
terms of their underlying philosophical principles. The former expresses a form of graded
belief: strongly provable literals have a higher degree of belief than those provable by
default. Our approach is opposite and rejects such a view, as it takes the point that if a
literal is proved, it should be used like any other proved literal, regardless of the way of
derivation. Therefore, a comparison of our approach to the one of Gelfond and Son must
be taken with care.
Gelfond and Son have compared a suitable instance of their framework (which is more
general than ours) to preferred answer sets in [32]. 5 They have shown that for the syntactic
subclass of static and hierarchical domain descriptions (programs) with basic preference
relations, inference of literals under their and preferred answer set semantics coincide.
Informally, this class contains a kind of stratified programs, where the head of a default
rule d is in a higher stratum than the head of every other default rule d ′ which occurs in
the body of d . Moreover, conflicts and preference are only expressible on defaults d and d ′
5 In fact, the comparison relies on a preliminary definition of preferred answer sets which used the simplified
definition of the sequence Sα as discussed before Example 5.3. However, for programs with normality defaults
of the form considered in [32], the preliminary and present definition of preferred answer sets are equivalent (see
also the paragraph after Example 5.3).
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with contrary heads, and such heads must belong to the same stratum. Further conditions
on the default-free part of the program, including consistency, are imposed. An example of
a program in this class is the following variant of the birds & penguins example:
(1) bird ←
(2) swims ←
(3) ¬flies ← not flies,peng
(4) flies ← not¬flies,bird
(5) peng ← not¬peng,bird, swims
Here, (3) and (4) are in the same stratum and (5) is in a lower stratum; the default-
free part (1)–(2) is obviously consistent. This program has two answer sets, namely
A1 = {bird, swims,flies,peng}, and A2 = {bird, swims,¬flies,peng}. If we assume the
(single) preference (3) < (4), then our approach (as well as Gelfond and Son’s) yields
A2 as the unique preferred answer set, which seems intuitive. Note that A2 remains the
unique preferred answer set, regardless of a priority assigned to rule (5); other approaches,
including [3,8,48], select A1 under priorities (3) < (4) < (5).
The equivalence result of Gelfond and Son, which establishes a correspondence between
preferred answer sets and the answer sets of a normalized version of the domain
description, allows to mutually exploit results from [32] and the present paper. Our results
entail properties of corresponding domain descriptions in Gelfond and Son’s framework,
while their transformation t (P) can be utilized for readily reducing the inference problem
for a class of prioritized logic programs to the inference problem for extended logic
programs. It remains to be seen whether the equivalence result can be extended to further
classes of programs.
Inoue and Sakama. Preferred answer sets have previously been defined by Sakama and
Inoue [63]. In their approach, a preference relation on the answer sets of a generalized
extended disjunctive logic program is defined, which is derived from a reflexive and
transitive preference relation on the set of (possibly weakly negated) classical literals Lits.
Informally, in their approach an answer set A1 is at least as preferable as an answer set A2,
if there are literals a ∈ A1 \ A2 and b ∈ A2 \ A1 such that a has at least the priority of b
(expressed by b  a), and there is no literal c ∈ A2 \A1 which has strictly higher priority
than a (i.e., a  c and c 6 a); an answer set A1 is preferred, if there does not exist another
answer set A2 which is strictly preferable over A1. As demonstrated in [63], this approach
is suited for selecting answer sets based on a notion of likelihood for (possibly negated)
facts being true, and provides flexibility to dynamically adapt this likelihood depending on
the particular context. Moreover, it is shown that several forms of common sense reasoning,
including a default reasoning system, can be expressed in this framework.
Clearly, Inoue and Sakama’s approach, whose elements remind of the perfect model
semantics for disjunctive logic programs, was devised for a goal different from ours, and
is applicable to a wide range of problems. There is a suggestive straightforward syntactic
translation of our framework to the one in [63] as follows: For each rule r of the form
Head← Body in an extended logic program P , introduce an atom ar and add to the
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program the rule ar← Body. The only nontrivial preferences on the literals are those which
reflect rule priorities, i.e., if r < r ′, then ar ′  ar holds. However, Inoue and Sakama’s
preferred answer sets of the transformed program, cast to the language of P , do not
coincide with our preferred answer sets of (P,<) in general. In particular, for the program
in Example 3.2, Principle II is violated by this transformation.
Inoue and Sakama formalize in [63, Section 3.2] another variant of prioritized default
reasoning in their framework, which is based on Poole’s approach to default reasoning [55]
rather than on Reiter’s default logic. In this approach, like in [32,52,58] definite rules
and defeasible rules are distinguished, and an extension is built by selecting a maximal
set of defeasible rules which is consistent with the definite rules. In the formalization of
[63, Section 3.2], for each defeasible rule r: Head← Body an atom δr is introduced, and
r is replaced by the two rules Head← Body, δr and δr | not δr←. The nontrivial priorities
include not δr  δr for each rule, i.e., applying the rule is preferred, and the priorities
between rules.
In the case of Example 3.2, the approach selects both answer sets as preferred ones.
The reason is that all three rules (1)–(3) may be jointly chosen such that some answer set
exists, and all these answer sets are equally preferred. In general, if a program has some
answer set if all defeasible rules are included as regular ones, then, regardless of the priority
information imposed on the defeasible rules, all answer sets are selected as preferred ones.
This might not always be intended; it does not happen, however, if the rules—as in Poole’s
approach to default logic—do not use negation as failure in rule bodies. Finally, we remark
that Inoue and Sakama’s approach to prioritized logic programs, similar as our concept of
weakly preferred answer sets, always yields some preferred answer set provided that any
answer set of the program exists. On the other hand, different from ours, their approach
is nonmonotonic with respect to priorities: adding priority information may enlarge the
collection of the preferred answer sets, and result in the loss of conclusions.
Kowalski and Sadri. In [38], Kowalski and Sadri have proposed to consider rules with
negation in the head as exceptions to more general rules and to give them higher
priority. Technically, this is achieved by a redefinition of answer sets. It turns out that
the original answer sets remain answer sets according to the new definition whenever
they are consistent. The main achievement is that programs whose single answer set is
inconsistent become consistent in the new semantics. The approach can hardly be viewed
as a satisfactory treatment of preferences for several reasons:
(1) Preferences are implicit and highly restricted; the asymmetric treatment of positive
and negative information in this context seems unjustified from a knowledge
representation perspective.
(2) It is difficult to see how, for instance, exceptions of exceptions can be represented.
(3) Fewer conclusions are obtained than in the original answer set semantics, contrary
to what one would expect when preferences are taken into account.
It is, therefore, more reasonable to view Kowalski and Sadri’s approach as a contribution
to inconsistency handling rather than preference handling.
Nute. An early approach to priorities on rules of a logic program is due to Nute in his
formalization of defeasible reasoning [50,51], which has been further developed later on
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(see [52]). Nute’s approach divides the rules into absolute and defeasible ones, the former
being rules which apply under any circumstances and the latter being rules which are
applied by default; such rules also express subjunctive implications. Central to Nute’s
approach is an ordering of the rules by specificity and superiority of absolute rules.
Rules with contradictory conclusions are considered competitive, and a general superiority
ordering between such rules is defined based on their logical properties. A defeasible
reasoning process is defined by a modification of SLD resolution, in which superiority
of rules is taken into account.
From this outline, it is evident that Nute’s approach is quite different from ours and
other approaches discussed. Indeed, in his approach, prioritization is implicitly determined
by the logical entrenchment of the rules in the theory represented by the program, and user-
defined priority specification is not supported; moreover, the evaluation is proof-theoretic
(and thus to a great deal operational) rather than declarative. Thus, Nute’s approach offers
limited capability of expressing priorities, which is not sufficient for the need in practice.
Moreover, like with similar approaches, the operational nature of his approach makes it
difficult to assess the proper working on a complex program.
Pradhan and Minker. In [56] Pradhan and Minker show how priorities can be used
to combine different potentially conflicting databases. Preference information is used to
determine the information which has to be given up in the merging process. Three different
semantics of priorities are presented, two of them turn out to be equivalent.
There are two major differences between this and our work:
(1) Pradhan and Minker consider Datalog databases only, that is, neither explicit
negation nor negation as failure is admitted. Our approach is thus more general.
(2) The underlying preference relation is a relation on atoms, not on rules as in our
case. While this appears to be adequate for merging Datalog databases we strongly
believe that the more fine grained distinctions which are possible in our approach are
necessary for many knowledge representation problems. For instance, it is difficult
to see how our qualitative decision making example could be represented based on
preferences among atoms rather than rules.
Prakken and Sartor. Another approach to incorporate priorities into extended logic
programs has been presented in [58]. The authors develop a semantics which is based
on argumentation-theoretic foundations in the spirit of Dung’s semantics for extended
logic programming [21]. Similar as [52], Prakken and Sartor distinguish defeasible rules
(which may contain assumptions) and strict (nondefeasible) rules, which must not contain
assumptions; note that assumption-free rules can be either defeasible or strict, which is not
possible in our framework. Priorities are expressed in [58] by means of a strict partial order
on the set of rules. The basic concept of the approach is an argument, which is intuitively a
sequence of rules constituting a proof of a literal. The semantics of a program is defined in
terms of the set of justifiable arguments, which contains intuitively those arguments (and
only those) which must be accepted from the program, and such that there is no circular
dependency among the arguments. This set is the least fixpoint of a monotonic operator;
thus, the semantics is deterministic in the sense that it assigns a unique belief set to each
program and is therefore, closer to well-founded than to answer set semantics.
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A further difference between the approach in [58] and ours is that the former uses
priorities to resolve conflicts that emerge from arguments which arrive at opposite
conclusions, rather than for choosing a rule out of a set of (not necessarily conflicting)
rules for application. This is guided by the observation in [58] that in the legal domain,
priorities are mainly used for resolving conflicts between rules that arrive at opposite
conclusions. Furthermore, conflict resolution is defined in [58] in terms of preferability
among sets of rules, rather than pairs of rules. Prakken and Sartor generalize their approach
by introducing also defeasible priorities. There is no counterpart for this in our framework.
Zhang and Foo. In two subsequent papers [71,72], Zhang and Foo have presented a
framework for prioritized logic programs which at the syntactical level is very close to
ours. Also in that framework, priorities are expressed by a strict partial ordering on the
rules. However, the similarity is at the surface, since the approach to the semantics followed
by Zhang and Foo is fundamentally different. Their semantics is operationally defined,
in terms of a (nondeterministic) reduction of the initial prioritized program P , which is
reduced to an extended logic program P(P ), whose answers sets are preferred answer sets
of P ; the preferred answer sets of P are the answer sets of all programs P to which P may
be (nondeterministically) reduced. Roughly speaking, if we have priority r < r ′ among
rules of P , then r ′ will be ignored only if r ′ is defeated by P ′ =P \ {r ′}, i.e., every answer
set of P ′ defeats r ′; otherwise, r ′ is kept in P . Rules r ′ are removed from P subsequently
until no longer possible (see [71] for more details and formal definitions).
In general, Zhang and Foo’s concept of preferred answer set is different from ours.
Indeed, it is easy to see from the definitions that if the program without priorities has an
answer set, then also the prioritized program has a preferred answer set; As we have seen
above, this is not the case in our approach. For example, consider the following simple
program P :
(1) ¬p ← not p
(2) p ← not q
in which (1) is preferred over (2). The program P has the unique answer set A = {p},
and Zhang and Foo’s semantics returns A as the unique preferred answer set. However, if
we take the view that priorities are not defeasible, this is not acceptable straight away. The
rule (1) has higher priority than the rule (2), and not applying (1) because it is defeated after
application of the lower ranked rule (2) seems hardly defensible; therefore, (1) should be
applied, and also (2) should be applied because application of (1) does not defeat (2). The
joint application of (1) and (2) results in an inconsistency, however, and thus no answer
set for the given rule preference exists. Observe that if we change the priority ordering,
then A = {p} is the unique preferred answer set; this is exactly what is achieved by our
preferred and weakly preferred semantics.
A moment of reflection should convince the reader that this is indeed the desired
behavior. The first rule is a CWA default which tells that p is explicitly false if it is not
provable, which is more important than the rest of the program; in fact, by this high priority,
we must conclude that p is false, as there are no even more important rules which allow to
prove p. Such a CWA default should have low priority, however, since a proof of ¬p by
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failure to prove p is weaker than an explicit proof in terms of other rules. Therefore, the
priorities should actually be reversed. On the other hand, if preference is viewed as “use (1)
over (2) whenever possible”, i.e., the priorities are considered defeasible, then the answer
of Zhang and Foo’s semantics is meaningful.
Another example in which Zhang and Foo’s semantics differs from ours is the program
discussed in Example 5.3. Recall that this program (refer to it as P) has the two answer
sets A1 = {p,q} and A2 = {¬p,q}, none of which is preferred in our definition. However,
according to the definition of Zhang and Foo, the answer set A2 is preferred over A1.
This seems hardly defensible, since the highest priority rule of the program, p← notq ,
is executable if no other rules have been considered so far; hence, p should be concluded,
which rules out A2 as a maximally preferred answer set.
Furthermore, Zhang and Foo’s concept of preferred answer set does not obey Princi-
ple II. This can be shown by the same example which demonstrates the failure of Princi-
ple II for our weak preferred answer set semantics in the proof of Proposition 6.1; in fact,
our weak preferred answer sets coincide there with the preferred answer sets of Zhang and
Foo.
However, the concept is also different from weakly preferred answer sets, as for the
previously considered program P , both answer sets A1 and A2 are weakly preferred.
Notice that if we would use a stronger concept of weak preference, in which switches
of rules are weighted by priorities, then A1 would be ruled out; this would not be much
intuitive.
Zhang and Foo further introduce a concept of dynamic preferred answer sets, which
allows for expressing dynamic rule preference, i.e., the preference ordering of the rules can
be specified by additional meta-rules represented in the object language. The semantics of
such dynamic prioritized programs is then based on preferred answer sets for prioritized
logic programs. This approach is very general, but we believe that further investigation
is needed to clarify relevant aspects. An intuitive understanding of the global semantics
of a program, due to its involved operational definition, seems to require quite some
acquaintance with the approach. Furthermore, little is known about the properties of this
semantics, apart from the obvious requirement that the preferred answer sets should select
a subset of the answer sets of the prioritized program.
10. Further work and conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an approach for adding priorities to extended logic
programs. Our approach is based on the ideas that applying default rules means to jump to
conclusions, and that rules must be applied in an order compatible with the priorities. We
have formalized this intuition by introducing the dual reduct of an program, on which the
obedience to the preference information which is declared on the rules can be verified by
means of a simple operator; the preferred answer sets are those answer sets which amount
to fixpoints of this operator. To overcome the situation in which, due to inappropriate
priority information, no answer set is preferred, we have proposed a concept of weakly
preferred answer set, which can be seen as an approximation of a preferred answer set.
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In order to test the coherence of the preferred answer set approach, we have proposed two
principles which, as we believe, any formalism for prioritized knowledge representation
should satisfy. We have shown that preferred answer sets satisfy these principles, while a
number of other approaches to priorities on logic programs, many of which are inherited
from prioritized versions of default logic [60], do not satisfy these properties. This means
that our approach avoids problems which are present in these other approaches.
Furthermore, we have investigated the computational properties of our approach. We
have described algorithms for some of the computational tasks, and we accurately
determined the computational complexity of the main reasoning problems. It appeared that
our approach has rather benign computationally properties, in the sense that the preferred
answer sets do not increase the complexity compared to standard answer sets, and weakly
preferred answer sets increase the complexity only marginally.
Several issues remain for further work. One such issue is the extension to a syntac-
tically and semantically richer framework, which offers increased expressive capabili-
ties. Such capabilities can be provided by further extensions of logic programming be-
yond classical and default negation. For example, one such extension is disjunction in
the rule heads, which has been considered in the context of stable and answer set se-
mantics quickly after the invention of the stable semantics [30,59]. From the technical
side, a generalization of our approach to disjunctive extended logic programs appears
to be rather easy. The definition of dual reduct need not be changed, and the definition
of CR(S) has to take disjunctive rule heads into account; this can be handled similar
to the construction of a model of a disjunctive logic program. Concerning the computa-
tional impacts, we may expect an increase of the complexity by one level in the polyno-
mial hierarchy in the propositional case, analogous to the increase for answer set seman-
tics [22].
Another extension is from extended logic programs to the full language of Reiter’s
default logic; the approach described in this paper can be gracefully generalized to this
setting [10].
Further possible extensions of the present work are constructs for expressing dynamic
preferences in the framework. Several of the related approaches which we have discussed
in Sections 3 and 9 foresee a possibility of explicitly representing preference between rules
at the level of the object language, such that rule preferences may dynamically depend on
a given context. As we have briefly mentioned above, there are no principal obstacles to
extending our approach in this direction, such that priority information comes dynamically
into play. In the extended approach, the priority information needed for evaluating the
operator λR(A) on the dual program reduct is extracted from the answer set A, rather than
taken from the meta-level.
For the implementation of our approach, we can take benefit from the complexity results
which we have established. They unveil a close computational relationship of prioritized
logic programs to recent extensions of the stable model semantics by constraints [13]. In
the quoted paper, the authors define a concept of weak constraint, which as opposed to
traditional a constraint may be violated in a model; however, globally as many constraints
as possible should be satisfied. As shown in [13], stable models with weak constraints allow
for expressing problems which are PNP[O(logn)]-complete; hence, by our complexity
results, a polynomial-time translation of weakly preferred answer set semantics into stable
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models with weak constraints is feasible. An experimental implementation of preferred
and weakly preferred answer sets on top of the deductive reasoning system dlv [25,26] is
planned for the future.
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Appendix A. Proofs
For convenience, we use in the following the notation R < S, where R and S are sets of
rules and < is an ordering, as a shorthand for the property that r < r ′ holds for all rules r
in R and r ′ in S.
Lemma 5.2. Let R= (R,<) be a fully prioritized ground rule base, and let A ∈AS(R).
Then, the following are equivalent:
(i) A is a preferred answer set ofR.
(ii) For every r ∈ R, the reduct Ar is defined and fires in the construction of λR(A), if
and only if r is a generating rule of A.
Proof. (⇐) If (ii) is true, then clearly A= λR(A), which means A is a preferred answer
set ofR.
(⇒) Assume that (ii) is false; hence, there are two cases.
(1) r is a rule which is not applied in A, but Ar fires in the construction of λR(A). Since
Ar ∈ AR, we have pre(r)⊆A. Now if head(r) ∈A then, according to the construction of
CP , r cannot be defeated in A. Hence r must be applied in A, which is a contradiction to
our assumption. Otherwise, if head(r) /∈ A, then A is not a fixpoint of λR, and thus not a
preferred answer set.
(2) r is applied in A, but Ar does not fire in the construction of λR(A). Then, λR(A)
must contain a literal defeating r . This literal is not contained in A, which implies that A
is not a fixpoint of λR and thus not a preferred answer set. 2
Lemma 6.8. Let A ∈ AS(P), where P = (P,<) is a fully prioritized finite ground
program, and let <′ be an optimal ordering for A. If τi from the canonical switching
sequence σ of <′ is nonvoid, then <i−1 has at position i a nondefeated zombie.
Proof. Suppose that τi moves a rule r ′ to position i and <i−1 has at this position a rule
r which is either not a zombie or already defeated. We derive a contradiction. The last
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step of τi , (i, i + 1), switches r and r ′; in <i , rules r ′ and r are at positions i and i + 1,
respectively. Observe that since r ′ is in its final position for <′, either r ′ is not a zombie,
or it is defeated in <i−1 by some rule at position < i .
Consider the ordering<′′ which coincides with <i−1 up to position i , has r ′ at position
i + 1, and such that its rest at positions i + 2, i + 3, . . . coincides with the tail of <′ at
positions i + 1, i + 2, . . . after removal of r . Then, the canonical switching sequences
transforming < into <′, respectively, σ ′ = τ ′0, . . . , τ ′k and σ ′′ = τ ′′0 , . . . , τ ′′k , are related as
follows. Let j be the position of r in <′. Then, τ ′′h = τ ′h, for all h = 0, . . . , i − 1; τ ′′i is
void; τ ′′h = τ ′h−1 \ (h− 1, h), for all h= i+ 1, . . . , j ; and τ ′′h = τ ′h, for all h= j + 1, . . . , k.
Consequently, the length of σ ′′ satisfies
∣∣σ ′′∣∣= k∑
h=0
∣∣τ ′′h ∣∣= i−1∑
h=0
∣∣τ ′h∣∣+ 0+ j∑
h=i+1
(∣∣τ ′h∣∣− 1)+ k∑
h=j+1
∣∣τ ′h∣∣
6
k∑
h=0
∣∣τ ′h∣∣− 1= |σ ′| − 1.
Hence, by Proposition 6.7, d(<,<′′) < d(<,<′). Since clearly A ∈ PAS(P,<′′), it
follows that <′ is not an optimal ordering for A, which is a contradiction. 2
Theorem 6.9. Let A ∈ AS(P), where P = (P,<) is a fully prioritized finite ground
program. Then, there exists an optimal ordering <′ for A such that τi from the canonical
switching sequence σ of <′ is nonvoid if and only if <i−1 has at position i a nondefeated
zombie z, and every nonvoid τi moves a rule defeating z to position i .
Proof (Sketch). We show that given an optimal ordering <′ which satisfies the property
for all j = 0, . . . , i − 1, we can construct another optimal ordering <′′ which satisfies
the property for all j = 0, . . . , i . By repeated application for i = 0,1,2, . . . we obtain the
result.
From Lemma 6.8, it follows that τi is nonvoid if and only if <i−1 has a nondefeated
zombie z at position i . Let r be the rule moved by τi to position i . Suppose r does not
defeat z. Then, j ′ and i ′ exist, i < j ′ < i ′, such that z is at position i ′ in<′ and the leftmost
killer of z, denoted g, is at position j ′ in <′.
Let <′′ be the ordering which coincides with <′ on positions 0,1,2, . . . , i − 1, has at
positions i, i+1, and i+2 the rules g, z, and r , respectively, and whose rest i+3, i+4, . . .
coincides with the rest i + 1, i+ 2, . . . of <′ after removal of g and r . It can be shown that
<′′ is an optimal ordering for A [11]. Moreover,<′′ fulfills the property for all j 6 i . This
proves the result. 2
Proposition 7.1. Given a fully prioritized (finite) propositional program P = (P,<)
and a set A ⊆ Lits, both deciding whether A ∈ AS(P ) and A ∈ PAS(P) is possible
in polynomial time. Moreover, these problems are complete for P (under logspace-
reductions).
Proof. It is well known that testing whether a set of literals A is an answer set of a
program P , i.e., condition γP (A) = A, can be done in polynomial time (cf. [5,22]);
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indeed, the Gelfond–Lifschitz reduct PA is computable in polynomial time, and Cn(PA)
is computable in polynomial time. Thus, deciding whether A ∈AS(P) is polynomial.
For deciding A ∈ PAS(P), we note that the additional condition λP (A) = A is also
polynomial-time checkable. Indeed, the dual reduct P ′ = AP can be clearly computed in
polynomial time, and each Sα , 06 α < ord(<), can be computed in polynomial time. Since
ord(<) is the number of rules in P ′, it is thus clear that CP ′(A)= λP (A) is polynomial-
time computable, which proves membership in P.
For establishing completeness, we observe that recognizing the (unique) preferred
answer set of a prioritized program P = (P,<) in which no negation (neither classical
nor default one) occurs is hard for P; in fact, this preferred answer set trivially corresponds
to the least model of P , and recognition of the least model of P is easily proved hard for P
from the well known result that inference of a positive atom p from a propositional logic
program P is P-complete (see [17]). Indeed, construct a program P ′ from P by adding all
rules q← p, where q is a propositional atom from the underlying language. Then, the set
PL of all propositional atoms is the least model of P ′, if and only if p is a consequence
of P . Since P ′ is easily constructed in logarithmic workspace, recognizing the least model
of P , and as a consequence, recognition of a preferred answer set of P is hard for P. This
proves the result. 2
Lemma 7.2. Let P be a propositional prioritized program, and let A ∈ AS(P). Then,
A ∈ PAS(P), if and only if some execution of FULL-ORDER outputs a fully prioritized
program P ′. Moreover, P ′ ∈FP(P) and A ∈PAS(P ′) hold for every such P ′, and either
all runs output some P ′, or all output “no”.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that some execution of FULL-ORDER produces a prioritized
program P ′ = (P,<′). It is not hard to see that P ′ ∈ FP(P). Moreover, from
Proposition 5.1, we derive that A ∈ PAS(P ′); indeed, by the construction of <′, every
zombie rule r ∈ P forA is defeated by the set T , which contains only heads of rules r ′ ∈ P
which are generating for A and such that r ′ <′ r . Thus, by Proposition 5.1, A ∈PAS(P ′),
which means A ∈PAS(P).
(⇒) Suppose A ∈ PAS(P). Then, by definition, there is a full prioritization P1 =
(P,<1) ∈FP(P) such that A ∈PAS(P1). We claim that there is a run of FULL-ORDER
which produces P1. Indeed, select the rules r in Step 3 along the ordering <1. An easy
induction, using Proposition 5.1, shows that every rule r selected in Step 3 which is labeled
“z” is defeated by the current set T . Therefore, this run of FULL-ORDER outputsP1. This
proves the first part of the lemma.
Furthermore, it can be shown that there are never runs of FULL-ORDER which output
some prioritized program P ′ = (P,<′) and “no” on the same input, respectively [11]. 2
Theorem 7.4. Given a finite propositional prioritized program P = (P,<), deciding
whether PAS(P) 6= ∅ is NP-complete. The problem is NP-hard even if < is a total order
and P does not involve strong negation.
Proof. For deciding whether AS(P ) 6= ∅, a proper fully prioritized version P ′ = (P,<′)
∈ FP(P) and an answer set A ⊆ Lits for P ′ may be guessed; the size of the guess is
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polynomial, and checking whether the guess is proper can be done from Proposition 7.3 in
polynomial time. Hence, the problem is in NP.
To show the hardness part, we construct for a collection of nonempty propositional
clauses C = {C1, . . . , Cm} on atoms p1, . . . ,pn a program P and a linear order < such
that the preferred answer sets of (P,<) correspond to the satisfying truth assignments of
C. Since the construction is polynomial and propositional satisfiability is a well known
NP-complete problem, this proves NP-hardness.
The program P involves the propositional atoms pi, pˆi , i = 1, . . . , n, as well as a,b,
and unsat. It has four groups of rules R1, . . . ,R4 as follows. The first group R1 contains
the rules
pi← pi, pˆi← pˆi for all i = 1, . . . , n;
(The use of these seemingly redundant clauses will become clear later.) The next groupR2
contains the rules
pi ← not pˆi, pˆi ← not pi for all i;
The group R3 contains for each clause Ci = {`i,1, . . . , `i,k} from C a rule
unsat← `+i,1, . . . , `+i,m,
where
`+i,j =
{
pk, if Li,j =¬pk , for some k;
pˆk, if Li,j = pk , for some k.
The last group R4 contains the rules
(1) a ← not b
(2) b ← unsat
Notice that the program P =⋃4i=1Ri does not involve strong negation.
It is easy to see that the answer sets of P correspond 1–1 to the truth assignments φ to
the atoms p1, . . . ,pn. For each such φ, the corresponding answer set Aφ contains those
atoms pi such that φ(pi) = true and all atoms pˆi , where φ(pi) = false; if φ satisfies C,
then Aφ contains a, and if φ does not satisfy C, then Aφ contains unsat and b.
Now let us define priorities. Choose any total order< on P such that Ri < Rj holds, for
all i < j , and such that the rule (1) is ordered before rule (2).
For any answer set Aφ of P , let us trace the construction of λP (Aφ)=⋃i Si . The dual
reducts Aφr of the (surviving) rules r ∈R1 are considered first; they fire and yield atom pi
(respectively, pˆi ), precisely if it occurs in Aφ , for each i = 1, . . . , n. Next, the rules of R2
are examined, which all survive the dual reduction; however, each of them is either a dead
rule or a zombie, which is defeated by the union
⋃
j Sj of the preceding sets Sj . Therefore,
none of them fires. In the next step, the reducts Aφr of the rules r ∈ R3 are considered.
Some of them fires and adds unsat, precisely if the truth assignment φ does not satisfy C
(i.e., iff unsat ∈Aφ). Consequently, on the atoms pi, pˆi , and unsat, CP (Aφ) will coincide
with Aφ ; it thus depends on the rules of R4 whether all priorities are properly respected
or not. Rule (1) fires and adds a to C(AφP), since it is not defeated by the preceding
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sets Sj . If unsat ∈ Aφ , then the dual reduct of (2) fires and adds b to C(AφP); this means
λP (Aφ) 6=Aφ , however, as in this case a /∈Aφ . On the other hand, if unsat /∈Aφ , then (2)
does not survive the dual reduction and λP (Aφ)=Aφ .
Hence, PAS(P)= {A ∈AS(P ) | a ∈A,unsat /∈A}, and there is a 1–1 correspondence
between the preferred answer sets of P and the satisfying truth assignments of C. Clearly,
the program P is constructible from C in logarithmic space (and thus in polynomial time);
this proves the result. 2
Theorem 7.7. Given a finite propositional prioritized program P = (P,<) and a literal
L, deciding whether P |=L is co-NP-complete. The problem is co-NP-hard even if < is a
total order and P does not involve strong negation.
Proof. The membership part is similar as in Theorem 7.4, with the difference that for
refuting P |= L, we have to find a preferred answer set A which does not contain
L. Hardness follows from a simple reduction of inference to the complement of the
consistency problem; given a prioritized program P , let p be a fresh propositional atom.
Then, P |= p iff P has no preferred answer set. 2
Proposition 7.8. Given a finite propositional prioritized program P = (P,<) and A ∈
AS(P ), computing pvdP (A) is in F1p2 [O(logn)], i.e., possible in polynomial time with
O(logn) many oracle queries, where n is the input size. Moreover, also computing pvd(P)
is in F1p2 [O(logn)].
Proof. Given a prioritized program P = (P,<), an answer set A ∈AS(A) and an integer
k > 0, deciding whether pvdP (A)6 k is in NP: we can guess a proper full prioritization
P ′ = (P,<′) ∈FP(P) and a total ordering<′′ such that A ∈ PAS(P,<′′) and d(<′,<′′)
6 k, and check this guess in polynomial time. Indeed, the guess has clearly polynomial
size; computing d(<,<′) is obviously polynomial, and checking whether A is a preferred
answer set of P ′ is polynomial by Proposition 7.1.
As a consequence, the value of pvdP (A) is computable in a binary search on the range
[0, s], where s =O(|P |2), by making O(log |P |)=O(log |I |) many calls to an NP oracle,
where |I | is the size of the input 〈P,A, k〉. Hence, it follows that computing pvdP (A) is
in FPNP[O(logn)].
The value of pvd(P) can be computed similarly in a binary search. Indeed, given P
and k, deciding whether pvd(P) 6 k is also in NP: Since pvd(P) 6 k holds iff some
A ∈ AS(P) exists such that pvdP (A) 6 k, simply extend the previous guess-and-check
algorithm for deciding whether pvdP (A) 6 k by a guess for A; observe that testing A ∈
AS(P) is polynomial. Hence, it follows that computing pvd(P) is in F1p2 [O(logn)]. 2
Theorem 7.9. Given a prioritized propositional programP = (P,<) and a setA⊆ Lits of
ground literals, deciding whether A ∈WAS(P) is PNP[O(logn)]-complete. Hardness for
PNP[O(logn)] holds even if < is a total ordering and P does not contain strong negation.
Proof (Sketch). From Proposition 7.8, it follows that algorithm REC-WAS can be
implemented such that it runs in polynomial time and makes O(logn) many queries to
an NP oracle. Thus, by Proposition 7.1, membership in PNP[O(logn)] follows.
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To show the hardness part, we reduce the problem PARITY(SAT) to our problem, which
is as follows [69]. Given instances I = C1, . . . ,C` of SAT (i.e., propositional clause sets
Ci ), decide whether the number of Yes-instances among them is odd.
We construct in [11] from I a prioritized program P = (P,<) and a set of literals A
in polynomial time such that A ∈WAS(P) if and only if I is a Yes-instance, provided
that I satisfies the following property: If Ci is a No-instance of SAT, then also Ci+1 is
No-instance, for every i = 1, . . . , `− 1, where `> 3. Somewhat surprisingly, this strong
assertion suffices to prove PNP[O(logn)]-hardness [69].
The proof is rather technical, and we confine here to give the basic idea of the
construction; the details can be found in [11]. The program P has several components,
ordered as follows: PC < Ppar < Pch < Pvar < Po/e. They serve for the following
purposes.
PC encodes the clauses of the SAT instances C1, . . . ,C`. For each Ci , there is a collection
of rules in PC . Some of them will be zombie rules, and for defeating them some generating
rules from the lower priority part Pvar have to be moved in front of them. In particular,
some distinguished rule fi← must be moved in front of them in any optimal solution, if
Ci is unsatisfiable.
Ppar encodes the parity check on the number of satisfiable Ci . In particular, it effects that
any weakly preferred answer set contains a designated atom odd, if this number is odd, and
an atom even, if it is even. Zombie rules in Ppar may be defeated by rules from Po/e.
Pch is a “channel” which separates the components PC and Ppar from the remaining
components Pvar and Po/e, such that moving rules across this channel is very costly, and
as few rules as necessary are moved across it in any weakly preferred answer set. This
channel is unidirectional, i.e., in any weakly preferred answer set rules are moved from
Pvar and Po/e into PC and Ppar, but not vice versa.
Pvar andPo/e contain rules which are potentially moved across the channelPch, in order
to defeat zombie rules inPC andPpar. In particular,Po/e contains rules defining atoms odd
and even, respectively.
The program P is designed to have two answer sets: Aodd, which contains odd, and
Aeven, which contains even, such that Aodd ∈ WAS(P) iff C is a Yes-instance, and
Aeven ∈WAS(P) iff C is a No-instance. 2
Theorem 7.10. Given a prioritized propositional program P = (P,<), computing an
arbitrary A ∈WAS(P) is complete for FNP//OptP[O(logn)]. Hardness holds even if < is
a total ordering and P does not contain strong negation.
Proof. The proof of membership in FNP//OptP[O(logn)] is in the discussion preceding
the theorem.
Hardness for FNP//OptP[O(logn)] can be shown by a reduction from the problem X-
MAXIMAL MODEL [15]: Given a set C = {C1, . . . ,Cm} of propositional clauses on
atoms Y = {y1, . . . , yn} and a set X ⊆ Y , compute a model M (satisfying assignment)
of C whoseX-part is maximal, i.e., for every other modelM ′ of C such thatM 6=M ′, there
exists some atom yi ∈X such that M |= yi and M ′ |= ¬yi .
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This problem is proved complete for FNP//OptP[O(logn)] in [15,16], under the
following concept of “metric reduction” [15]: 6 Problem5 reduces to problem5′, if there
are polynomial-time computable functions f (x) and g(x, y), such that: (i) for any instance
I of 5, f (I) is an instance of 5′, and f (I) has a solution iff I has a solution; and (ii) for
any arbitrary solution S of f (I), g(I,S) is a solution of I .
We describe a reduction of X-MAXIMAL MODEL to computing an arbitrary weakly
preferred answer set. The reduction must comprise two polynomial-time computable
functions f (C) and g(C,A), such that:
(i) f (C) is a prioritized program P , such that P has some weakly preferred answer set
iff C is satisfiable, and
(ii) for every weakly preferred answer set A of P , g(C,A) is a X-maximal model of C.
The reduction is similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 7.4. We use fresh atoms
unsat and yˆi , for every yi ∈ Y , and define three sets of rules S1, S2, and S3 as follows. The
set S1 contains all rules
yi ← yi, yˆi ← yˆi for all yi ∈ Y \X;
S2 contains all rules
yi ← not yˆi , yˆi ← notyi for all yi ∈ Y ;
and S3 contains for each clause Ci = {`i,1, . . . , `i,k} from C a rule
unsat ← `+i,1, . . . , `+i,k,not unsat
where similar as above `+i,j = yh if `i,j = ¬yh, and `+i,j = yˆh if `i,j = yh, for any atom
yh ∈ Y . Let P = (P,<), where P = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 and < is any total order on P such that
S1 < S2 < S3 and the rules in S2 are ordered as follows:
y1← not yˆ1 < yˆ1← noty1 < y2← not yˆ2 < yˆ2← noty2 < · · ·
< yn← not yˆn < yˆn← notyn.
It is easily seen that the answer sets A of P correspond 1–1 to the models M of C. Due to
the ordering of the rules in S2, by switching some rules yi← not yˆi and yˆi← notyi , where
yi ∈X, every answer set of P can be made preferred; by the rules in S1, no switch of the
respective rules for yi ∈ Y \X is necessary. The number pvdP (A) amounts to the number
of atoms yi ∈ X which are false in the corresponding model M of C. Thus, the weakly
preferred answer sets of P correspond 1–1 to the models M of C in which a maximum
number of atoms from X are true. Clearly, each of these models is a X-maximal model
of C.
Clearly, P is constructible from C in polynomial time, and from any A ∈WAS(P),
the corresponding X-maximal model M of C is easily constructed in time polynomial in
the size of A. Therefore, polynomial-time functions f (C) and g(C,A) as required exist,
6 In [16] a slightly different form of reduction is used as in [15]. It requires that f (I ) must always have
solutions, but for any maximal solution S of f (I ), the function g(I,S) is only defined if I has solutions; our
proof can be easily adapted to this setting.
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and problem X-MAXIMAL MODEL reduces to computing an arbitrary weakly preferred
answer set. This proves hardness for FNP//OptP[O(logn)]. 2
Theorem 7.11. Deciding, given a finite prioritized propositional programP = (P,<) and
a literal L, whetherP |=w L is PNP[O(logn)]-complete. Hardness for PNP[O(logn)] holds
even if < is a total order and P does not have strong negation.
Proof. The problem P |=w L can be solved in polynomial time with O(log |P |) many NP
oracle calls: first compute pvd(P) and then query the NP oracle whether some answer set
Awith pvdP (A)6 pvd(P) exists such that L /∈A. The oracle is in NP, since a properP ′ =
(P,<′) ∈ FP(P), a total ordering <′′, and set of literals A such that A ∈ PAS(P,<′′),
L /∈A, and d(<′,<′′)6 pvd(P) can be guessed and checked in polynomial time (cf. proof
of Proposition 7.8). Hence, the problem is in PNP[O(logn)].
The hardness part follows from the reduction in the proof of Theorem 7.10 and the
following lemma: Given a set C = {C1, . . . ,Cm} of propositional clauses on atoms Y , a
set X ⊆ Y , and an atom A, deciding whether A is true in all X-maximum models of C
is 1p2 [O(logn)]-complete, where a model M is X-maximum, if it has largest possible X-
part, i.e., |M ∩X|> |M ′ ∩X| for all other models M ′ of C. The weakly preferred answer
sets of the prioritized programP constructed in the proof of Theorem 7.10 correspond 1–1
to the X-maximum models of C in the obvious way; this implies PNP[O(logn)]-hardness
of weak inference under the asserted restriction. 2
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